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Fencer Intel
medium 6.5

CVE-2023-24827 json

Credential disclosure in syft when SYFT_ATTEST_PASSWORD environment variable set in syft

published 3y ago modified 4mo ago also EUVD-2023-0732 , GHSA-jp7v-3587-2956 , GO-2023-1533

cvss
6.5
version 3.1, CNA
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
0.8%
EPSS 0.8% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 56%
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

syft is a a CLI tool and Go library for generating a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) from container images and filesystems. A password disclosure flaw was found in Syft versions v0.69.0 and v0.69.1. This flaw leaks the password stored in the SYFT_ATTEST_PASSWORD environment variable. The `SYFT_ATTEST_PASSWORD` environment variable is for the `syft attest` command to generate attested SBOMs for the given container image. This environment variable is used to decrypt the private key (provided with `syft attest --key <path-to-key-file>`) during the signing process while generating an SBOM attestation. This vulnerability affects users running syft that have the `SYFT_ATTEST_PASSWORD` environment variable set with credentials (regardless of if the attest command is being used or not). Users that do not have the environment variable `SYFT_ATTEST_PASSWORD` set are not affected by this issue. The credentials are leaked in two ways: in the syft logs when `-vv` or `-vvv` are used in the syft command (which is any log level >= `DEBUG`) and in the attestation or SBOM only when the `syft-json` format is used. Note that as of v0.69.0 any generated attestations by the `syft attest` command are uploaded to the OCI registry (if you have write access to that registry) in the same way `cosign attach` is done. This means that any attestations generated for the affected versions of syft when the `SYFT_ATTEST_PASSWORD` environment variable was set would leak credentials in the attestation payload uploaded to the OCI registry. This issue has been patched in commit `9995950c70` and has been released as v0.70.0. There are no workarounds for this vulnerability. Users are advised to upgrade.

Patch / fix

  • go github.com/anchore/syft 0.70.0
  • anchore syft 0.70.0

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CISA SSVC

Exploitation
Proof of concept is public
Automatable
no
Technical impact
partial
Assessed
last yr.

Exploit prediction

0.79% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 56% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-15).

Exploits and checks

  • github.com https://github.com/anchore/syft/security/advisories/GHSA-jp7v-3587-2956 referenced PoC, tagged "exploit" by a source, unverified

CVSS scores

assigned by version score vector
CNA 3.1 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
GitHub 3.1 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
NVD 3.1 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Affected packages

ecosystem package affected fixed in
go github.com/anchore/syft
>=0.69.0, <0.70.0
0.70.0

Affected products

  • anchore syft

Classification

Weakness
  • CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
  • CWE-532 Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File

References

Sources

Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.

CPEs and fixed versions use Anchore's correction of NVD's data: Improved package identification information.