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Fencer Intel
medium 5.3

CVE-2023-34459 json

OpenZeppelin Contracts's MerkleProof multiproofs may allow proving arbitrary leaves for specific trees

published 3y ago modified 2mo ago also EUVD-2023-1907 , GHSA-wprv-93r4-jj2p

cvss
5.3
version 3.1, CNA
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
0.4%
EPSS 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 31%
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

OpenZeppelin Contracts is a library for smart contract development. Starting in version 4.7.0 and prior to version 4.9.2, when the `verifyMultiProof`, `verifyMultiProofCalldata`, `procesprocessMultiProof`, or `processMultiProofCalldat` functions are in use, it is possible to construct merkle trees that allow forging a valid multiproof for an arbitrary set of leaves.

A contract may be vulnerable if it uses multiproofs for verification and the merkle tree that is processed includes a node with value 0 at depth 1 (just under the root). This could happen inadvertedly for balanced trees with 3 leaves or less, if the leaves are not hashed. This could happen deliberately if a malicious tree builder includes such a node in the tree.

A contract is not vulnerable if it uses single-leaf proving (`verify`, `verifyCalldata`, `processProof`, or `processProofCalldata`), or if it uses multiproofs with a known tree that has hashed leaves. Standard merkle trees produced or validated with the @openzeppelin/merkle-tree library are safe.

The problem has been patched in version 4.9.2.

Some workarounds are available. For those using multiproofs: When constructing merkle trees hash the leaves and do not insert empty nodes in your trees. Using the @openzeppelin/merkle-tree package eliminates this issue. Do not accept user-provided merkle roots without reconstructing at least the first level of the tree. Verify the merkle tree structure by reconstructing it from the leaves.

Patch / fix

  • npm @openzeppelin/contracts 4.9.2
  • npm @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable 4.9.2
  • openzeppelin contracts 4.9.2
  • openzeppelin contracts_upgradeable 4.9.2

Is CVE-2023-34459 in your dependencies? Fencer shows which of your repositories are affected as soon as an advisory lands, and opens the fix as a pull request.

Check with Fencer

CISA SSVC

Exploitation
none
Automatable
no
Technical impact
partial
Assessed
last yr.

Exploit prediction

0.37% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 31% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-15).

CVSS scores

assigned by version score vector
CNA 3.1 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
GitHub 3.1 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
NVD 3.1 5.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Affected packages

ecosystem package affected fixed in
npm @openzeppelin/contracts
>=4.7.0, <4.9.2
4.9.2
npm @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable
>=4.7.0, <4.9.2
4.9.2

Affected products

  • OpenZeppelin openzeppelin-contracts

Classification

Weakness
  • CWE-354 Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value

References

Sources

Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.

The maintainers of OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts published their own advisory on GitHub. Reviewed sources take precedence over it.