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Fencer Intel
medium 4.3

CVE-2023-41037 json

Cleartext Signed Message Signature Spoofing in openpgpjs

published 3y ago modified 4mo ago also EUVD-2023-2270 , GHSA-ch3c-v47x-4pgp

cvss
4.3
version 3.1, CNA
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
0.4%
EPSS 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 29%
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

OpenPGP.js is a JavaScript implementation of the OpenPGP protocol. In affected versions OpenPGP Cleartext Signed Messages are cryptographically signed messages where the signed text is readable without special tools. These messages typically contain a "Hash: ..." header declaring the hash algorithm used to compute the signature digest. OpenPGP.js up to v5.9.0 ignored any data preceding the "Hash: ..." texts when verifying the signature. As a result, malicious parties could add arbitrary text to a third-party Cleartext Signed Message, to lead the victim to believe that the arbitrary text was signed. A user or application is vulnerable to said attack vector if it verifies the CleartextMessage by only checking the returned `verified` property, discarding the associated `data` information, and instead _visually trusting_ the contents of the original message. Since `verificationResult.data` would always contain the actual signed data, users and apps that check this information are not vulnerable. Similarly, given a CleartextMessage object, retrieving the data using `getText()` or the `text` field returns only the contents that are considered when verifying the signature. Finally, re-armoring a CleartextMessage object (using `armor()` will also result in a "sanitised" version, with the extraneous text being removed. This issue has been addressed in version 5.10.1 (current stable version) which will reject messages when calling `openpgp.readCleartextMessage()` and in version 4.10.11 (legacy version) which will will reject messages when calling `openpgp.cleartext.readArmored()`. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should check the contents of `verificationResult.data` to see what data was actually signed, rather than visually trusting the contents of the armored message.

Patch / fix

  • npm openpgp 4.10.11, 5.10.1
  • openpgpjs openpgpjs 4.10.11, 5.10.0

Is CVE-2023-41037 in your dependencies? Fencer shows which of your repositories are affected as soon as an advisory lands, and opens the fix as a pull request.

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CISA SSVC

Exploitation
none
Automatable
no
Technical impact
partial
Assessed
2y ago

Exploit prediction

0.35% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 29% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-15).

Exploits and checks

  • github.com https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/security/advisories/GHSA-ch3c-v47x-4pgp referenced PoC, tagged "exploit" by a source, unverified

CVSS scores

assigned by version score vector
CNA 3.1 4.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
GitHub 3.1 4.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
NVD 3.1 4.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

Affected packages

ecosystem package affected fixed in
npm openpgp
<4.10.11
>=5.0.0, <5.10.1
4.10.11
5.10.1

Affected products

  • openpgpjs openpgpjs

Classification

Weakness
  • CWE-347 Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature

References

Sources

Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.

The maintainers of openpgpjs/openpgpjs published their own advisory on GitHub. Reviewed sources take precedence over it.