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Fencer Intel
high 8.4

CVE-2023-46115 json

Updater Private Keys Possibly Leaked via Vite Environment Variables in tauri-cli

published 3y ago modified 2mo ago also EUVD-2023-2620 , GHSA-2rcp-jvr4-r259

cvss
8.4
version 3.1, CNA
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
0.2%
EPSS 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 10%
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

Tauri is a framework for building binaries for all major desktop platforms. This advisory is not describing a vulnerability in the Tauri code base itself but a commonly used misconfiguration which could lead to leaking of the private key and updater key password into bundled Tauri applications using the Vite frontend in a specific configuration. The Tauri documentation used an insecure example configuration in the `Vite guide` to showcase how to use Tauri together with Vite. Copying the following snippet `envPrefix: ['VITE_', 'TAURI_'],` from this guide into the `vite.config.ts` of a Tauri project leads to bundling the `TAURI_PRIVATE_KEY` and `TAURI_KEY_PASSWORD` into the Vite frontend code and therefore leaking this value to the released Tauri application. Using the `envPrefix: ['VITE_'],` or any other framework than Vite means you are not impacted by this advisory. Users are advised to rotate their updater private key if they are affected by this (requires Tauri CLI >=1.5.5). After updating the envPrefix configuration, generate a new private key with `tauri signer generate`, saving the new private key and updating the updater's `pubkey` value on `tauri.conf.json` with the new public key. To update your existing application, the next application build must be signed with the older private key in order to be accepted by the existing application.

Patch / fix

  • crates.io tauri-cli 1.5.6, 2.0.0-alpha.16
  • npm @tauri-apps/cli 1.5.6, 2.0.0-alpha.16
  • tauri tauri 2.0.0

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CISA SSVC

Exploitation
Proof of concept is public
Automatable
no
Technical impact
partial
Assessed
2y ago

Exploit prediction

0.20% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 10% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-14).

CVSS scores

assigned by version score vector
CNA 3.1 8.4 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
GitHub 3.1 8.4 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
NVD 3.1 5.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Affected packages

ecosystem package affected fixed in
crates.io tauri-cli
>=2.0.0-alpha.0, <2.0.0-alpha.16
>=1.0.0, <1.5.6
2.0.0-alpha.16
1.5.6
npm @tauri-apps/cli
>=2.0.0-alpha.0, <2.0.0-alpha.16
>=1.0.0, <1.5.6
2.0.0-alpha.16
1.5.6

Affected products

  • tauri-apps tauri

Classification

Weakness
  • CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
  • CWE-522 Insufficiently Protected Credentials

References

Sources

Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.

The maintainers of tauri-apps/tauri published their own advisory on GitHub. Reviewed sources take precedence over it.