Skip to content
Fencer Intel
medium 4.7

CVE-2024-39314 json

toy-blog administrative token leaked through the command line parameter

published 2y ago modified 4mo ago also EUVD-2024-37897

cvss
4.7
version 3.1, CNA
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
0.2%
EPSS 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 8%
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

toy-blog is a headless content management system implementation. Starting in version 0.4.3 and prior to version 0.5.0, the administrative password was leaked through the command line parameter. The problem was patched in version 0.5.0. As a workaround, pass `--read-bearer-token-from-stdin` to the launch arguments and feed the token from the standard input in version 0.4.14 or later. Earlier versions do not have this workaround.

Patch / fix

  • kisaragieffective toy-blog 0.5.0
  • toy-blog_project toy-blog 0.5.0

Is CVE-2024-39314 in your stack? Fencer shows which of your repositories are affected as soon as an advisory lands, and opens the fix as a pull request.

Check with Fencer

CISA SSVC

Exploitation
none
Automatable
no
Technical impact
partial
Assessed
2y ago

Exploit prediction

0.19% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 8% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-11).

CVSS scores

assigned by version score vector
CNA 3.1 4.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Affected products

  • KisaragiEffective toy-blog

Classification

Weakness
  • CWE-214 Invocation of Process Using Visible Sensitive Information
  • CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor

References

Sources

Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.

CPEs and fixed versions use Anchore's correction of NVD's data: Added CPE configurations because not yet analyzed by NVD.