CVE-2025-71152 json
net: dsa: properly keep track of conduit reference
published 9mo ago modified 10d ago also EUVD-2026-4398
- cvss
- 7.8
- version 3.1, NVD
- cisa kev
- Not listed
- not in CISA's catalog
- epss
- 0.1%
- EPSS 0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 3%
- public exploits
- 0
- none known
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: dsa: properly keep track of conduit reference
Problem description -------------------
DSA has a mumbo-jumbo of reference handling of the conduit net device and its kobject which, sadly, is just wrong and doesn't make sense.
There are two distinct problems.
1. The OF path, which uses of_find_net_device_by_node(), never releases the elevated refcount on the conduit's kobject. Nominally, the OF and non-OF paths should result in objects having identical reference counts taken, and it is already suspicious that dsa_dev_to_net_device() has a put_device() call which is missing in dsa_port_parse_of(), but we can actually even verify that an issue exists. With CONFIG_DEBUG_KOBJECT_RELEASE=y, if we run this command "before" and "after" applying this patch:
(unbind the conduit driver for net device eno2) echo 0000:00:00.2 > /sys/bus/pci/drivers/fsl_enetc/unbind
we see these lines in the output diff which appear only with the patch applied:
kobject: 'eno2' (ffff002009a3a6b8): kobject_release, parent 0000000000000000 (delayed 1000) kobject: '109' (ffff0020099d59a0): kobject_release, parent 0000000000000000 (delayed 1000)
2. After we find the conduit interface one way (OF) or another (non-OF), it can get unregistered at any time, and DSA remains with a long-lived, but in this case stale, cpu_dp->conduit pointer. Holding the net device's underlying kobject isn't actually of much help, it just prevents it from being freed (but we never need that kobject directly). What helps us to prevent the net device from being unregistered is the parallel netdev reference mechanism (dev_hold() and dev_put()).
Actually we actually use that netdev tracker mechanism implicitly on user ports since commit 2f1e8ea726e9 ("net: dsa: link interfaces with the DSA master to get rid of lockdep warnings"), via netdev_upper_dev_link(). But time still passes at DSA switch probe time between the initial of_find_net_device_by_node() code and the user port creation time, time during which the conduit could unregister itself and DSA wouldn't know about it.
So we have to run of_find_net_device_by_node() under rtnl_lock() to prevent that from happening, and release the lock only with the netdev tracker having acquired the reference.
Do we need to keep the reference until dsa_unregister_switch() / dsa_switch_shutdown()? 1: Maybe yes. A switch device will still be registered even if all user ports failed to probe, see commit 86f8b1c01a0a ("net: dsa: Do not make user port errors fatal"), and the cpu_dp->conduit pointers remain valid. I haven't audited all call paths to see whether they will actually use the conduit in lack of any user port, but if they do, it seems safer to not rely on user ports for that reference. 2. Definitely yes. We support changing the conduit which a user port is associated to, and we can get into a situation where we've moved all user ports away from a conduit, thus no longer hold any reference to it via the net device tracker. But we shouldn't let it go nonetheless - see the next change in relation to dsa_tree_find_first_conduit() and LAG conduits which disappear. We have to be prepared to return to the physical conduit, so the CPU port must explicitly keep another reference to it. This is also to say: the user ports and their CPU ports may not always keep a reference to the same conduit net device, and both are needed.
As for the conduit's kobject for the /sys/class/net/ entry, we don't care about it, we can release it as soon as we hold the net device object itself.
History and blame attribution -----------------------------
The code has been refactored so many times, it is very difficult to follow and properly attribute a blame, but I'll try to make a short history which I hope to be correct.
We have two distinct probing paths: - one for OF, introduced in 2016 i ---truncated---
Patch / fix
- Linux Linux 6.1.191, 6.6.130, 6.12.78, 6.18.4, 6.19
- linux Debian 13 6.12.85-1
- linux Debian 14 6.18.5-1
debian advisories DEBIAN-CVE-2025-71152
- linux Ubuntu 24.04 LTS 6.8.0-136.136
- linux Ubuntu 25.10 6.17.0-29.29
- linux-aws Ubuntu 24.04 LTS 6.8.0-1061.64
- linux-aws Ubuntu 25.10 6.17.0-1015.15
- linux-gcp Ubuntu 24.04 LTS 6.8.0-1064.72
- linux-gcp Ubuntu 25.10 6.17.0-1018.19
- linux-gke Ubuntu 24.04 LTS 6.8.0-1059.67
- linux-ibm Ubuntu 24.04 LTS 6.8.0-1061.62
ubuntu advisories UBUNTU-CVE-2025-71152
Ubuntu security data © Canonical Ltd., from https://github.com/canonical/ubuntu-security-notices via OSV; changed: normalised to fixed package versions per release. CC BY-SA 4.0
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/bc3305eeeee5d8e43005ad46e252991e46d10f33 commit
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/ec2b34acb1894cfc10ed22d8277ca4f11e9f4b23 commit
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/b358fc6ff3b35a29f7f677da1c67af67d0d560cb commit
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/0e766b77ba5093583dfe609fae0aa1545c46dbbd commit
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/06e219f6a706c367c93051f408ac61417643d2f9 commit
Is CVE-2025-71152 in your stack? Fencer shows which of your repositories are affected as soon as an advisory lands, and opens the fix as a pull request.
Check with FencerVendor advisories
What the vendors themselves say about their products: affected, fixed or not affected, and what to do.
red hat product security vex CVE-2025-71152 updated cvss 5.5
kernel: net: dsa: properly keep track of conduit reference
-
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 perf, kernel, python-perf, kernel-kdump, kernel-firmware, kernel-bootwrapper, +1 moreaffected: no fix planned “Out of support scope”
-
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 perf, kernel, bpftool, kernel-rt, python-perf, kernel-kdump, +8 more Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 perf, kernel, bpftool, kernel-rt, kernel-core, kernel-tools, +29 more Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 rv, perf, rtla, kernel, bpftool, libperf, +83 more Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10 kernelnot affected: vulnerable code not present
Red Hat CSAF VEX © Red Hat, Inc., from https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/; changed: reduced to product statuses and remediations. CC BY 4.0 · csaf
Exploit prediction
0.14% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 3% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-09).
CVSS scores
| assigned by | version | score | vector |
|---|---|---|---|
| NVD | 3.1 | 7.8 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
Affected products
- Linux Linux
Classification
- Technology feeds
References
- git.kernel.org /stable/c/bc3305eeeee5d8e43005ad46e252991e46d10f33
- git.kernel.org /stable/c/ec2b34acb1894cfc10ed22d8277ca4f11e9f4b23
- git.kernel.org /stable/c/b358fc6ff3b35a29f7f677da1c67af67d0d560cb
-
git.kernel.org
/stable/c/0e766b77ba5093583dfe609fae0aa1545c46dbbd
patch
-
git.kernel.org
/stable/c/06e219f6a706c367c93051f408ac61417643d2f9
patch
Sources
- CVE List CVE-2025-71152
- NVD CVE-2025-71152
Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.