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Fencer Intel
high 7.1

CVE-2026-100413 json

SeaweedFS: Hard-coded SSH host key can be presented by certain standalone SFTP Helm deployments

published 26d ago modified 10d ago also BIT-seaweedfs-2026-100413 , EUVD-2026-101519 , GHSA-hqp5-j79g-vr89

cvss
7.1
version 3.1, NVD
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
0.4%
EPSS 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 30%
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

SeaweedFS is a distributed storage system for files and blobs. From 4.0.388 until 4.41, the SFTP Helm chart embedded one unencrypted Ed25519 private host key in k8s/charts/seaweedfs/templates/sftp/sftp-secret.yaml as stringData.seaweedfs_sftp_ssh_private_key. A standalone deployment presented that public key when sftp.enabled and sftp.enableAuth were true, sftp.existingConfigSecret was not supplied, the legacy sftp.sshPrivateKey path remained selected, a valid config-ssh Secret allowed startup, and hostKeysFolder did not provide a later Ed25519 signer. An attacker able to redirect or intercept client traffic could impersonate that SFTP endpoint to clients that trusted the published host identity, exposing password credentials or data sent to the rogue endpoint. Default all-in-one and non-authenticated standalone paths did not load the key. This issue is fixed in version 4.41.

Patch / fix

  • bitnami seaweedfs 4.41.0
  • seaweedfs seaweedfs 4.41

Is CVE-2026-100413 in your dependencies? Fencer shows which of your repositories are affected as soon as an advisory lands, and opens the fix as a pull request.

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CISA SSVC

Exploitation
Proof of concept is public
Automatable
no
Technical impact
partial
Assessed
11d ago

Exploit prediction

0.37% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 30% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-09).

Exploits and checks

  • github.com https://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/security/advisories/GHSA-hqp5-j79g-vr89 referenced PoC, tagged "exploit" by a source, unverified

CVSS scores

assigned by version score vector
CNA 4.0 7.0 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N
CNA 4.0 7.0 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
NVD 3.1 7.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

Affected packages

ecosystem package affected fixed in
bitnami seaweedfs
>=4.0.388, <4.41.0
4.41.0

Affected products

  • seaweedfs seaweedfs

Classification

Weakness
  • CWE-321 Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key

References

Sources

Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.

CPEs and fixed versions use Anchore's correction of NVD's data: Added CPE configurations because not yet analyzed by NVD.