Skip to content
Fencer Intel
high 7.1

CVE-2026-115477 json

obsidian-tc: Declined human-in-the-loop confirmations can permit destructive calls over HTTP

published 17d ago modified 11d ago also GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc , EUVD-2026-109082

cvss
7.1
version 4.0, CNA
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
0.4%
EPSS 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 29%
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

obsidian-tc is a governed, agent-ready Model Context Protocol server for Obsidian vaults. From 1.13.0 until 1.31.4, on a Streamable HTTP deployment with `auth.jwtSecret` configured and a 2026-07-28-era client declaring `elicitation.form` support, a dispatch-gated tool call offered an `inputRequired` confirmation could still complete after the human declined or cancelled, or the elicitation response was omitted or malformed, provided the client echoed the validly bound `requestState` on resubmission. The server trusted an authentic, call-bound state as proof of approval even though that state was minted before the `elicitation/create` leg was asked and proved only that the resubmission belonged to the same call. A client behaving incorrectly or under an attacker's control could therefore execute dispatch-gated destructive vault operations without the human's approval, while still requiring the caller's ordinary tool permissions. Only tools marked `destructive: true` or requiring a scope with a human-in-the-loop floor were reachable through this bypass. The sixteen handler-side conditionally gated tools, including `write_note` overwrite and `move_note`, did not read elicitation state on the modern wire and let neither approval nor decline through that path. Affected deployments using stdio or leaving `auth.jwtSecret` unset instead used the CLI `elicit_token` fallback and did not offer this `requestState` round trip. The fix does not prevent a malicious client from reporting a fabricated approval, because the server cannot verify that the client displayed the form or that a human saw it. This issue is fixed in version 1.31.4.

Patch / fix

  • npm obsidian-tc 1.31.4

Is CVE-2026-115477 in your dependencies? Fencer shows which of your repositories are affected as soon as an advisory lands, and opens the fix as a pull request.

Check with Fencer

CISA SSVC

Exploitation
Proof of concept is public
Automatable
no
Technical impact
partial
Assessed
11d ago

Exploit prediction

0.35% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 29% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-09).

Exploits and checks

  • github.com https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/issues/967 referenced PoC, tagged "exploit" by a source, unverified

CVSS scores

assigned by version score vector
CNA 4.0 7.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
CNA 4.0 7.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Affected packages

ecosystem package affected fixed in
npm obsidian-tc
>=1.13.0, <1.31.4
1.31.4

Affected products

  • The-40-Thieves obsidian-tc

Classification

Weakness

References

Sources

Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.