CVE-2026-115478 json
obsidian-tc: Memory-lifecycle tools overwrite unowned notes or partially commit lifecycle changes
published 17d ago modified 10d ago also GHSA-r3g7-r4hr-m258 , EUVD-2026-109083
- cvss
- 7.1
- version 4.0, CNA
- cisa kev
- Not listed
- not in CISA's catalog
- epss
- 0.3%
- EPSS 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 25%
- public exploits
- 0
- none known
Summary
obsidian-tc is a governed, agent-ready Model Context Protocol server for Obsidian vaults. From 1.0.1 until 1.31.4, `create_entity`, `link_entities`, `rename_entity`, `unlink_entities` and `delete_entity` regenerate memory notes from SQLite at the computed `memory/<type>/<name>.md` path without reliably preserving note ownership or the consistency of a failed lifecycle operation. During shared materialization, a hand-authored note or an orphan left by a different entity whose name sanitized to the same path could have its entire body overwritten on the next write naming that type and name, with non-owned frontmatter preserved. `rename_entity` also seeded the destination path with a direct atomic write without validating ownership and could overwrite a foreign note there. Separately, several tools mutated SQLite before fallible filesystem work: `create_entity` and `link_entities` inserted the row or relation before materialization; `rename_entity` updated the entity, including a retired status, before updating its note; `unlink_entities` removed a relation before rematerializing the source note; and `delete_entity`'s cascade removed the target and its relations before rematerializing neighbouring notes. A later filesystem failure could therefore leave a row or relation changed and the memory graph inconsistent with the notes on disk even when the operation failed. An authorized caller with the required memory-tool permissions could, without intending to, destroy the body of a vault note outside the entity being written; `delete_entity` additionally requires its deletion permission and destructive confirmation, which this memory flaw does not bypass. Snapshots-before-write through `restore_note` mitigate the overwrite only where snapshots are enabled and the note had previously been written through obsidian-tc. This issue is fixed in version 1.31.4.
Patch / fix
- npm obsidian-tc 1.31.4
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Check with FencerCISA SSVC
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- partial
- Assessed
- 10d ago
Exploit prediction
0.32% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 25% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-09).
CVSS scores
| assigned by | version | score | vector |
|---|---|---|---|
| CNA | 4.0 | 7.1 | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N |
| CNA | 4.0 | 7.1 | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X |
Affected packages
| ecosystem | package | affected | fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | obsidian-tc | >=1.0.1, <1.31.4 |
1.31.4 |
Affected products
- The-40-Thieves obsidian-tc
Classification
References
-
github.com
/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/pull/978
web
-
github.com
/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/commit/99f7914ca0fbeed92e7c4d39cc8c3e5830dab133
web
-
github.com
/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/security/advisories/GHSA-r3g7-r4hr-m258
web
-
github.com
/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/blob/v1.31.4/CHANGELOG.md
web
-
github.com
/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/releases/tag/v1.31.4
web
-
nvd.nist.gov
/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-115478
advisory
-
github.com
/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc
package
Sources
- CVE List CVE-2026-115478
- GitHub Advisory GHSA-r3g7-r4hr-m258
- NVD CVE-2026-115478
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