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Fencer Intel
high 7.8

CVE-2026-129703 json

vulnerability-lookup: Feed key or API key authentication creates full web session bypassing password and 2FA

published yesterday modified yesterday also EUVD-2026-126186

cvss
7.8
version 4.0, CNA
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
0.3%
EPSS 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 24%
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

In the vulnerability-lookup web application, the authentication decorators for feed-key requests (auth_feedkey_func in website/decorators.py) and API-key requests (auth_func in website/web/api/v1/common.py) called Flask-Login's login_user() function. This caused the HTTP response to a request authenticated solely by a feed key (supplied as the X-FEED-KEY URL parameter) or an API key (supplied as the X-API-KEY header) to set a session cookie that grants full authenticated access to every page in the application, without requiring a password or two-factor authentication.

The practical impact is that any party possessing a leaked feed URL (a common occurrence, as feed URLs are shared with RSS readers) or an API key could obtain a valid web session for the associated account. This session provides access to the user's account page, which exposes the API key and other profile data, and for accounts with the administrator role, access to the /admin interface, enabling full administrative control of the application.

The vulnerability affects all users whose feed key or API key is exposed. No prior authentication, user interaction, or special network conditions are required; a single HTTP request with the token is sufficient to establish the session. The session persists until it expires, and because it is not bound to the original credential (a related CWE-613 issue noted by the developers), revoking the feed key or API key does not invalidate the already-created session.

The fix replaces the login_user() call with assignment to g._login_user, which Flask-Login's current_user property reads for the current request only, without writing any session cookie. The affected views remain unchanged and continue to see the authenticated user for the single request.

Patch / fix

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CISA SSVC

Exploitation
none
Automatable
yes
Technical impact
total
Assessed
yesterday

Exploit prediction

0.31% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 24% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-17).

CVSS scores

assigned by version score vector
CNA 4.0 7.8 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N
CNA 4.0 7.8 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Affected products

  • vulnerability-lookup vulnerability-lookup

Classification

Weakness
  • CWE-287 Improper Authentication
  • CWE-613 DEPRECATED: Insufficient Session Expiration

References

Sources

Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.