CVE-2026-40344 json
MinIO has an Unauthenticated Object Write via Missing Signature Verification in Unsigned-Trailer Uploads
published 6mo ago modified last mo. also EUVD-2026-24579 , GHSA-9c4q-hq6p-c237 , GO-2026-5284
- cvss
- 8.2
- version 3.1, NVD
- cisa kev
- Not listed
- not in CISA's catalog
- epss
- 0.4%
- EPSS 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 36%
- public exploits
- 0
- none known
Summary
MinIO is a high-performance object storage system. Starting in RELEASE.2023-05-18T00-05-36Z and prior to RELEASE.2026-04-11T03-20-12Z, an authentication bypass vulnerability in MinIO's Snowball auto-extract handler (`PutObjectExtractHandler`) allows any user who knows a valid access key to write arbitrary objects to any bucket without knowing the secret key or providing a valid cryptographic signature. Any MinIO deployment is impacted. The attack requires only a valid access key (the well-known default `minioadmin`, or any key with WRITE permission on a bucket) and a target bucket name. When `authTypeStreamingUnsignedTrailer` support was added, the new auth type was handled in `PutObjectHandler` and `PutObjectPartHandler` but was never added to `PutObjectExtractHandler`. The snowball auto-extract handler's `switch rAuthType` block has no case for `authTypeStreamingUnsignedTrailer`, so execution falls through with zero signature verification. The `isPutActionAllowed` call before the switch extracts the access key and checks IAM permissions, but does not verify the cryptographic signature. An attacker sends a PUT request with `X-Amz-Content-Sha256: STREAMING-UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD-TRAILER`, `X-Amz-Meta-Snowball-Auto-Extract: true`, and an `Authorization` header containing a valid access key with a completely fabricated signature. The request is accepted and the tar payload is extracted into the bucket. Users of the open-source minio/minio project should upgrade to MinIO AIStor RELEASE.2026-04-11T03-20-12Z or later. If upgrading is not immediately possible, block unsigned-trailer requests at the load balancer. Reject any request containing X-Amz-Content-Sha256: STREAMING-UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD-TRAILER at the reverse proxy or WAF layer. Clients can use STREAMING-AWS4-HMAC-SHA256-PAYLOAD-TRAILER (the signed variant) instead. Alternatively, restrict WRITE permissions. Limit s3:PutObject grants to trusted principals. While this reduces the attack surface, it does not eliminate the vulnerability since any user with WRITE permission can exploit it with only their access key.
Patch / fix
- minio minio release.2026-04-11t03-20-12z
- govulncheck-vulndb openSUSE Leap 16.0 0.0.20260723T184607-160000.1.1
opensuse advisories openSUSE-SU-2026:21483-1
- github.com/minio/minio@76913a9 commit
- github.com/minio/minio#16484 pull request
- github.com/minio/minio/security/advisories/GHSA-9c4q-hq6p-c237 advisory
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Check with FencerCISA SSVC
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- yes
- Technical impact
- partial
- Assessed
- 6mo ago
Exploit prediction
0.42% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 36% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-09).
CVSS scores
| assigned by | version | score | vector |
|---|---|---|---|
| CNA | 4.0 | 8.8 | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N |
| GitHub | 3.1 | 8.2 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L |
| CNA | 4.0 | 8.8 | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X |
| NVD | 3.1 | 8.2 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L |
Affected packages
| ecosystem | package | affected | fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| go | github.com/minio/minio | >=0.0.0-20230506025312-76913a9fd5c6, <=0.0.0-20260212201848-7aac2a2c5b7c >=0.0.0-20230506025312-76913a9fd5c6 |
no fix listed |
Affected products
- minio minio
Classification
References
-
github.com
/minio/minio/pull/16484
web, issue-tracking, patch
-
github.com
/minio/minio/commit/76913a9fd5c6e5c2dbd4e8c7faf56ed9e9e24091
web, patch
-
github.com
/minio/minio/security/advisories/GHSA-9c4q-hq6p-c237
web, patch, vendor-advisory, advisory
-
nvd.nist.gov
/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40344
advisory
-
github.com
/minio/minio
package
Sources
- CVE List CVE-2026-40344
- GitHub Advisory GHSA-9c4q-hq6p-c237
- NVD CVE-2026-40344
- OSV GO-2026-5284
Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.
CPEs and fixed versions use Anchore's correction of NVD's data: Added CPE configurations because not yet analyzed by NVD.