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Fencer Intel
critical 9.4

CVE-2026-47407 json

PraisonAI Platform has a cross-workspace IDOR + member-role privilege escalation

published 5mo ago modified 18d ago also EUVD-2026-46319 , GHSA-h8q5-cp56-rr65 , PYSEC-2026-482

cvss
9.4
version 4.0, CNA
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
0.3%
EPSS 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 23%
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 0.1.4, the Platform server exposes resources under `/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/...` and protects them with a `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` FastAPI dependency. The dependency only checks that the caller is a member of the workspace_id in the URL prefix. The route handlers then look up the inner resource (`agent_id`, `issue_id`, `project_id`, `label_id`, `comment_id`, `dependency_id`) by primary key alone. The resource's own `workspace_id` is never compared to the URL's `workspace_id`. A user can therefore put their own workspace in the URL prefix and any other workspace's resource ID in the path. The auth check passes, since they really are a member of the prefix workspace. The service then returns the cross-tenant resource for read, update, or delete. There is a second bug in the member-management routes (`add_member`, `update_member_role`, `remove_member`, `update_workspace`, `delete_workspace`). Each one inherits the default `min_role="member"` from `require_workspace_member`. Any basic member can therefore promote themselves to admin or owner, demote or remove other members, and delete the workspace. The role hierarchy exists in the schema but is not enforced. Registration is open at `/api/v1/auth/register` with no email verification. The default server bind is `0.0.0.0:8000` (`python -m praisonai_platform`). One curl from any unauthenticated network position is enough to bootstrap into the system. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.

Patch / fix

  • pypi praisonai-platform 0.1.4
  • praison praisonai-platform 0.1.4

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CISA SSVC

Exploitation
Proof of concept is public
Automatable
no
Technical impact
total
Assessed
3mo ago

Exploit prediction

0.30% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 23% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-11).

Exploits and checks

  • github.com https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-h8q5-cp56-rr65 referenced PoC, tagged "exploit" by a source, unverified

CVSS scores

assigned by version score vector
CNA 4.0 9.4 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
CNA 4.0 9.4 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Affected packages

ecosystem package affected fixed in
pypi praisonai-platform
<0.1.4
0.1.4

Affected products

  • MervinPraison praisonai-platform

Classification

Weakness
  • CWE-269 Improper Privilege Management
  • CWE-639 Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
  • CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization

References

Sources

Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.

CPEs and fixed versions use Anchore's correction of NVD's data: Added CPE configurations because not yet analyzed by NVD.