Skip to content
Fencer Intel
none 0.0

CVE-2026-49989 json

CrateDB's Blob HTTP handler bypasses authorization

published 4mo ago modified last mo. also EUVD-2026-58717 , GHSA-2xv8-gjwh-fv8p

cvss
0.0
version 3.1, GitHub
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
0.5%
EPSS 0.5% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 41%
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

CrateDB is a distributed SQL database. Prior to versions 6.2.8 and 6.3.2, any authenticated user can read or delete any blob whose SHA-1 digest they know, and can plant new blobs unconditionally, in any blob table, regardless of `GRANT`s. CrateDB has two ways to access blob storage: SQL (`SELECT ... FROM blob.<table>` and friends) and the blob HTTP API (`GET|PUT|DELETE /_blobs/{table}/{digest}`). The SQL path goes through `AccessControl`, which is what enforces privilege grants; that's why `SELECT digest FROM blob.secret_blobs` fails for a user who has no grants on the table. The HTTP path authenticates the request but never asks `AccessControl` whether the authenticated user is allowed to touch the table. So a user with no grants gets `MissingPrivilegeException` from SQL and `200 OK` plus the blob bytes from `GET /_blobs/secret_blobs/<digest>`. Deployments that don't use `BLOB TABLE` are unaffected. Authentication itself still works; the bug is strictly that being authenticated as anyone is treated as sufficient for any blob op. Versions 6.2.8 and 6.3.2 fix the issue.

Patch / fix

  • maven io.crate:crate 6.2.8, 6.3.2
  • cratedb cratedb 6.2.8, 6.3.2
  • io.crate crate 6.2.8, 6.3.2

Is CVE-2026-49989 in your dependencies? Fencer shows which of your repositories are affected as soon as an advisory lands, and opens the fix as a pull request.

Check with Fencer

CISA SSVC

Exploitation
Proof of concept is public
Automatable
no
Technical impact
partial
Assessed
2mo ago

Exploit prediction

0.47% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 41% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-11).

Exploits and checks

  • github.com https://github.com/crate/crate/security/advisories/GHSA-2xv8-gjwh-fv8p referenced PoC, tagged "exploit" by a source, unverified

CVSS scores

assigned by version score vector
CNA 4.0 7.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
GitHub 3.1 0.0 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N
CNA 4.0 7.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Affected packages

ecosystem package affected fixed in
maven io.crate:crate
<6.2.8
>=6.3.0, <6.3.2
6.2.8
6.3.2

Affected products

  • crate crate

Classification

Weakness

References

Sources

Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.

CPEs and fixed versions use Anchore's correction of NVD's data: Added CPE configurations because not yet analyzed by NVD.