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Fencer Intel
medium 6.5

CVE-2026-54050 json

Sakai: IDOR in Profile Image Deletion Allows Any Authenticated User to Delete Any User's Profile Image

published 2mo ago modified last mo. also EUVD-2026-78875 , GHSA-9284-fjc3-fmmj

cvss
6.5
version 3.1, CNA
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
0.3%
EPSS 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 24%
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

Sakai is a Collaboration and Learning Environment (CLE). From 23.0 until 23.5 and 25.3, the DELETE /api/users/{userId}/profile/image endpoint allows an authenticated user to delete another user's profile image because ProfileController.removeProfileImage() passes the attacker-controlled userId to ProfileServiceImpl.removeProfileImage() without verifying ownership, and profileImageUploadedRepository.deleteById(userId) removes the selected row. The related DELETE /api/users/{userId}/profile/pronunciation endpoint also omits session validation and ownership checks before ProfileServiceImpl.removePronunciationRecording() deletes the target user's recording. The upload path is not affected because it already verifies ownership, and superusers remain intentionally authorized to modify other profiles. Successful exploitation can repeatedly remove profile identity artifacts, including administrator and instructor images, and disrupt workflows that rely on those artifacts. This issue is fixed in versions 23.5, 25.3, and 26.0.

Patch / fix

  • maven org.sakaiproject.profile2:profile2-api 23.5
  • maven org.sakaiproject.profile2:profile2-impl 23.5
  • sakailms sakai 23.5, 25.3
  • org.sakaiproject.profile2 profile2-api 23.5, 25.3
  • org.sakaiproject sakai-web-api 23.5, 25.3

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CISA SSVC

Exploitation
Proof of concept is public
Automatable
no
Technical impact
partial
Assessed
last mo.

Exploit prediction

0.31% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 24% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-11).

Exploits and checks

  • github.com https://github.com/sakaiproject/sakai/security/advisories/GHSA-9284-fjc3-fmmj referenced PoC, tagged "exploit" by a source, unverified

CVSS scores

assigned by version score vector
CNA 3.1 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
GitHub 3.1 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Affected packages

ecosystem package affected fixed in
maven org.sakaiproject.profile2:profile2-api
>=23.0, <23.5
>=25.0, <=25.2
23.5
maven org.sakaiproject.profile2:profile2-impl
>=23.0, <23.5
>=25.0, <=25.2
23.5

Affected products

  • sakaiproject sakai

Classification

Weakness
  • CWE-639 Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

References

Sources

Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.

CPEs and fixed versions use Anchore's correction of NVD's data: Added CPE configurations because not yet analyzed by NVD.