CVE-2026-54885 json
Server-side request forgery in Boruta OAuth request_uri and OpenID jwks_uri fetching
published 3mo ago modified 19d ago also EEF-CVE-2026-54885 , EUVD-2026-51143 , GHSA-5q9h-vf5j-fr2g
- cvss
- 6.9
- version 4.0, CNA
- cisa kev
- Not listed
- not in CISA's catalog
- epss
- 0.5%
- EPSS 0.5% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 41%
- public exploits
- 0
- none known
Summary
Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability in malach-it Boruta allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause the OAuth/OpenID authorization server to issue outbound HTTP requests to attacker-chosen URIs, including internal services and cloud metadata endpoints.
Three code paths fetch remote URIs supplied by the requester without sufficient validation of the target. Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base.fetch_unsigned_request/1 in lib/boruta/oauth/request/base.ex dereferences the OAuth request_uri parameter from the authorization request via Finch.build(:get, request_uri) |> Finch.request(OpenIDHttpClient). Boruta.Openid.parse_registration_params/2 in lib/boruta/openid.ex dereferences the jwks_uri supplied in an OpenID Connect dynamic client registration request. Boruta.Ecto.Clients.refresh_jwk_from_jwks_uri/1 in lib/boruta/adapters/ecto/clients.ex later refreshes the stored jwks_uri for an existing client. In all three paths the only validation is that the URI parses with a scheme (and one of the two request_uri clauses does not even restrict the scheme to http or https). The implementations do not require HTTPS, do not enforce a host or IP allowlist, do not reject loopback, private, link-local, or other non-public ranges after DNS resolution, do not cap response size, and do not constrain redirects. An attacker can therefore steer the server's HTTP client at arbitrary network targets reachable from the Boruta host.
This issue affects boruta: from 2.3.2 before 2.3.7.
Patch / fix
- hex boruta 2.3.7
- malach-it boruta 2.3.7
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Check with FencerCISA SSVC
- Exploitation
- Proof of concept is public
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- partial
- Assessed
- 3mo ago
Exploit prediction
0.47% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 41% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-11).
Exploits and checks
- github.com https://github.com/malach-it/boruta_auth/security/advisories/GHSA-5q9h-vf5j-fr2g referenced PoC, tagged "exploit" by a source, unverified
CVSS scores
| assigned by | version | score | vector |
|---|---|---|---|
| CNA | 4.0 | 6.9 | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N |
| CNA | 4.0 | 6.9 | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X |
Affected packages
| ecosystem | package | affected | fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| hex | boruta | >=2.3.2, <2.3.7 |
2.3.7 |
Affected products
- malach-it boruta
Classification
- Weakness
-
- CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery
References
-
github.com
/malach-it/boruta_auth/commit/001e3dc5c259e67c6f907e98867eda4141c96d0d
patch
-
github.com
/malach-it/boruta_auth/commit/95fb10b78129355e475681f324c9a01ef0af2be5
patch
-
github.com
/malach-it/boruta_auth/security/advisories/GHSA-5q9h-vf5j-fr2g
vendor-advisory, related, exploit, advisory
-
cna.erlef.org
/cves/CVE-2026-54885.html
related, web
-
osv.dev
/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-54885
related
-
hex.pm
/packages/boruta
package
Sources
- CVE List CVE-2026-54885
- NVD CVE-2026-54885
- OSV EEF-CVE-2026-54885
Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.
CPEs and fixed versions use Anchore's correction of NVD's data: Added CPE configurations because not yet analyzed by NVD.