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Fencer Intel
critical 9.4

CVE-2026-55181 json

Tugtainer: OIDC login remains accessible when OIDC_ENABLED is false

published 5mo ago modified last mo. also EUVD-2026-90192 , GHSA-rg7c-vpfp-2w43

Unreviewed: the maintainers' own advisory

Published by the maintainers on their GitHub repository Quenary/tugtainer. GitHub has not reviewed it into the GitHub Advisory Database, so the affected packages and versions are the maintainers' word. Read the full advisory on GitHub.

cvss
9.4
version 3.1, CNA
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
0.6%
EPSS 0.6% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 49%
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

Tugtainer is a self-hosted app for automating updates of Docker containers. Prior to version 1.30.3, Tugtainer's OIDC authentication can still be initiated even when OIDC_ENABLED=false. The /auth/oidc/enabled endpoint correctly reports that OIDC is disabled. However, a direct request to /auth/oidc/login still starts the OIDC login flow, returns HTTP 302, sets an oidc_state cookie, and redirects the user to the configured OIDC authorization endpoint. This bypasses the intended OIDC disable switch. This issue has been patched in version 1.30.3.

Patch / fix

  • quenary tugtainer 1.30.3

Is CVE-2026-55181 in your stack? Fencer shows which of your repositories are affected as soon as an advisory lands, and opens the fix as a pull request.

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CISA SSVC

Exploitation
Proof of concept is public
Automatable
yes
Technical impact
total
Assessed
last mo.

Exploit prediction

0.60% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 49% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-11).

Exploits and checks

  • github.com https://github.com/Quenary/tugtainer/security/advisories/GHSA-rg7c-vpfp-2w43 referenced PoC, tagged "exploit" by a source, unverified

CVSS scores

assigned by version score vector
CNA 3.1 9.4 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L

Affected products

  • Quenary tugtainer

Classification

Weakness

References

Sources

Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.

The maintainers of Quenary/tugtainer published their own advisory on GitHub. Reviewed sources take precedence over it.

CPEs and fixed versions use Anchore's correction of NVD's data: Added CPE configurations because not yet analyzed by NVD.