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Fencer Intel
critical 10.0

CVE-2026-61567 json

AVideo-Encoder: unauthenticated command execution through streamer login trust

published 4mo ago modified 9d ago also EUVD-2026-112508 , GHSA-rf63-6vwm-wv8p

Unreviewed: the maintainers' own advisory

Published by the maintainers on their GitHub repository WWBN/AVideo-Encoder. GitHub has not reviewed it into the GitHub Advisory Database, so the affected packages and versions are the maintainers' word. Read the full advisory on GitHub.

cvss
10.0
version 3.1, CNA
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
0.5%
EPSS 0.5% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 44%
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

AVideo is a video-sharing Platform. Prior to 8.1.0, the live-streaming endpoint `view/videosListToLive.php` accepts an attacker-named streamer in `webSiteRootURL`, calls `Login::run` in `objects/Login.php`, and trusts the returned JSON as session state. An unauthenticated remote attacker who can host an HTTP service reachable by the encoder can self-grant `isLogged` and `canStream` without legitimate credentials. The endpoint requires only nonempty `playlists_id` and `APISecret` values; `APISecret` is forwarded rather than checked against a stored secret. This path never calls `Streamer::isURLAllowed` and therefore works regardless of the operator's streamer allowlist. It fetches a second attacker-controlled video-list response and interpolates `videos[].path` without shell argument escaping into `ffprobe` and `ffmpeg` commands passed to `exec`; `isAudio` calls `isVideo` to reach the `ffprobe` command. Paths containing shell delimiters execute arbitrary operating-system commands as the web-server user. The request filter does not inspect the video-list JSON. This can disclose database and stored streamer credentials, compromise the upstream platform using those credentials, modify files owned by the web-server user, establish persistence, and deny encoder service. This issue is fixed in version 8.1.0.

Patch / fix

Is CVE-2026-61567 in your stack? Fencer shows which of your repositories are affected as soon as an advisory lands, and opens the fix as a pull request.

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CISA SSVC

Exploitation
Proof of concept is public
Automatable
yes
Technical impact
partial
Assessed
9d ago

Exploit prediction

0.53% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 44% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-11).

Exploits and checks

  • github.com https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo-Encoder/security/advisories/GHSA-rf63-6vwm-wv8p referenced PoC, tagged "exploit" by a source, unverified

CVSS scores

assigned by version score vector
CNA 3.1 10.0 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Affected products

  • WWBN AVideo-Encoder

Classification

Weakness
  • CWE-78 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command

References

Sources

Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.

The maintainers of WWBN/AVideo-Encoder published their own advisory on GitHub. Reviewed sources take precedence over it.

CPEs and fixed versions use Anchore's correction of NVD's data: Added CPE configurations because not yet analyzed by NVD.