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Fencer Intel
high 8.6

CVE-2026-61572 json

AVideo-Encoder: unauthenticated full-response server-side request forgery

published 4mo ago modified 13d ago also EUVD-2026-112512 , GHSA-cvhm-j9cp-8w59

Unreviewed: the maintainers' own advisory

Published by the maintainers on their GitHub repository WWBN/AVideo-Encoder. GitHub has not reviewed it into the GitHub Advisory Database, so the affected packages and versions are the maintainers' word. Read the full advisory on GitHub.

cvss
8.6
version 3.1, CNA
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
0.3%
EPSS 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 17%
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

AVideo is a video-sharing Platform. Before the initial remediation attempt in 8.1.0, `url_get_contents` in `objects/functions.php` accepts caller-controlled destinations after only `FILTER_VALIDATE_URL` syntax validation, without rejecting private, loopback, or link-local addresses, and disables TLS peer verification. `Login::isLogged` reauthenticates using the attacker-settable `encoder_aVideoURL` cookie together with arbitrary nonempty `encoder_user` and `encoder_pass` cookies, and `Login::run` stores the raw fetched body in `result`. The unauthenticated `objects/login.json.php` endpoint returns that session object, enabling full-response exfiltration through a supplied `siteURL`; its `Streamer::isURLAllowed` gate allows all sites when the operator allowlist is empty, the default. An unauthenticated remote attacker can read internal HTTP and HTTPS responses, including cloud instance-metadata credentials, and reach internal TCP services. A further pre-authentication FTP variant in `view/youtubeDl.json.php` routes an ftp `videoURL` into `FTPDownloader`; `parseFtpUrl` in `objects/FTPDownloader.php` accepts its host and port for `ftp_connect`. This also enables requests to internal FTP services. Untrusted self-signed HTTPS certificates are accepted, and no account or operator interaction is required. Version 8.1.0 contains an initial remediation attempt that removes raw-response reflection and adds destination checks, but private-network exemptions and login TLS-verification defaults leave complete remediation of the described internal-network and TLS variants unresolved.

Patch / fix

  • wwbn avideo-encoder 8.1.0

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CISA SSVC

Exploitation
Proof of concept is public
Automatable
yes
Technical impact
partial
Assessed
13d ago

Exploit prediction

0.25% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 17% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-11).

Exploits and checks

  • github.com https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo-Encoder/security/advisories/GHSA-cvhm-j9cp-8w59 referenced PoC, tagged "exploit" by a source, unverified

CVSS scores

assigned by version score vector
CNA 3.1 8.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L

Affected products

  • WWBN AVideo-Encoder

Classification

Weakness
  • CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery

References

Sources

Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.

The maintainers of WWBN/AVideo-Encoder published their own advisory on GitHub. Reviewed sources take precedence over it.

CPEs and fixed versions use Anchore's correction of NVD's data: Added CPE configurations because not yet analyzed by NVD.