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Fencer Intel
high 8.3

CVE-2026-61654 json

Lightdash: Unauthenticated dbt Cloud webhook with path injection leaks API key

published 4mo ago modified 8d ago also EUVD-2026-113396 , GHSA-r4xc-vwqr-3252

Unreviewed: the maintainers' own advisory

Published by the maintainers on their GitHub repository lightdash/lightdash. GitHub has not reviewed it into the GitHub Advisory Database, so the affected packages and versions are the maintainers' word. Read the full advisory on GitHub.

cvss
8.3
version 4.0, CNA
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
0.4%
EPSS 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 32%
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

Lightdash is an open source business intelligence platform. In affected versions through 0.3213.0, the dbt Cloud webhook `POST /api/v1/projects/{projectUuid}/dbt-cloud/webhook` has no authentication middleware or signature validation. In `packages/backend/src/controllers/projectController.ts`, `testWebhook()` accepts `accountId` and `runId` from a `job.run.completed` request and passes them to `createPreviewWithExplores()` in `packages/backend/src/services/ProjectService/ProjectService.ts`. These unsanitized values are interpolated into the server-side dbt Cloud API URL, which is requested with the victim project's API key in the `Authorization` header. Path traversal through `accountId` changes the requested path on `cloud.getdbt.com` without changing its host, so the credential-bearing request reaches an attacker-influenced path on that fixed host. The advisory claims API-key theft, but the supplied evidence does not establish that the attacker can observe the `Authorization` header. The unauthenticated webhook also allows preview creation. The target must be a `dbt Cloud IDE` project and the attacker must know its `projectUuid`; the UUID is not enumerable but can be discovered in shared or multi-tenant contexts. Version 0.3214.0 fixes identifier path traversal and verifies webhook HMAC signatures only when a secret is configured; without a secret, unsigned webhooks continue to be processed.

Patch / fix

Is CVE-2026-61654 in your stack? Fencer shows which of your repositories are affected as soon as an advisory lands, and opens the fix as a pull request.

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CISA SSVC

Exploitation
Proof of concept is public
Automatable
no
Technical impact
partial
Assessed
8d ago

Exploit prediction

0.38% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 32% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-11).

Exploits and checks

  • github.com https://github.com/lightdash/lightdash/security/advisories/GHSA-r4xc-vwqr-3252 referenced PoC, tagged "exploit" by a source, unverified

CVSS scores

assigned by version score vector
CNA 4.0 8.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
CNA 4.0 8.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Affected products

  • lightdash lightdash

Classification

Weakness
  • CWE-89 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command

References

Sources

Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.

The maintainers of lightdash/lightdash published their own advisory on GitHub. Reviewed sources take precedence over it.

CPEs and fixed versions use Anchore's correction of NVD's data: Added CPE configurations because not yet analyzed by NVD.