CVE-2026-61729 json
SOCFortress CoPilot: Hardcoded Default Header Secret - Unauthenticated Active-Response Invocation and Alert Injection
published 4mo ago modified 6d ago also EUVD-2026-113994 , GHSA-x8gc-f8p4-frc2
Unreviewed: the maintainers' own advisory
Published by the maintainers on their GitHub repository socfortress/CoPilot. GitHub has not reviewed it into the GitHub Advisory Database, so the affected packages and versions are the maintainers' word. Read the full advisory on GitHub.
- cvss
- 9.4
- version 3.1, CNA
- cisa kev
- Not listed
- not in CISA's catalog
- epss
- 0.4%
- EPSS 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 31%
- public exploits
- 0
- none known
Summary
SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.76, `verify_graylog_header` in `backend/app/active_response/routes/graylog.py` and `verify_velociraptor_header` in `backend/app/incidents/routes/incident_alert.py` authenticate webhooks against `GRAYLOG_API_HEADER_VALUE` and `VELOCIRAPTOR_API_HEADER_VALUE` with the same publicly hardcoded fallback. The same default is shipped in `.env.example`. Deployments that leave either setting unset or unchanged permit an anonymous caller with the known header value to bypass the JWT authentication required by normal APIs. `POST /api/graylog/invoke` forwards attacker-selected `COMMAND`, `ACTION`, `VALUE` and `AGENT_ID` to the configured Wazuh manager without the command-enum validation of the authenticated invocation route, allowing active-response scripts to disrupt endpoints and manipulate defensive controls. `POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/threshold` and `POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/velo-sigma` accept forged alerts for arbitrary `customer_code` values and drive attacker-controlled OpenSearch queries. Active-response delivery requires a configured reachable Wazuh manager. Deployments with independently changed header secrets are not subject to this default-secret bypass. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.76.
Patch / fix
- github.com/socfortress/CoPilot@1b2c3f9 commit
- github.com/socfortress/CoPilot#939 pull request
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Check with FencerCISA SSVC
- Exploitation
- Proof of concept is public
- Automatable
- yes
- Technical impact
- partial
- Assessed
- 6d ago
Exploit prediction
0.38% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 31% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-11).
Exploits and checks
- github.com https://github.com/socfortress/CoPilot/security/advisories/GHSA-x8gc-f8p4-frc2 referenced PoC, tagged "exploit" by a source, unverified
CVSS scores
| assigned by | version | score | vector |
|---|---|---|---|
| CNA | 3.1 | 9.4 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H |
Affected products
- socfortress CoPilot
Classification
References
Sources
- CVE List CVE-2026-61729
- NVD CVE-2026-61729
- Maintainer advisory GHSA-x8gc-f8p4-frc2
Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.
The maintainers of socfortress/CoPilot published their own advisory on GitHub. Reviewed sources take precedence over it.