CVE-2026-61739 json
SOCFortress CoPilot: Authentication Bypass and Missing Authorization on Velociraptor Sigma Exclusion Rules (Detection Suppression)
published 4mo ago modified 12d ago also EUVD-2026-114005 , GHSA-c6jc-rh4j-wg88
Unreviewed: the maintainers' own advisory
Published by the maintainers on their GitHub repository socfortress/CoPilot. GitHub has not reviewed it into the GitHub Advisory Database, so the affected packages and versions are the maintainers' word. Read the full advisory on GitHub.
- cvss
- 7.5
- version 3.1, CNA
- cisa kev
- Not listed
- not in CISA's catalog
- epss
- 0.4%
- EPSS 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 31%
- public exploits
- 0
- none known
Summary
SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.77, the Velociraptor Sigma exclusion-management endpoints in `backend/app/incidents/routes/incident_alert.py` omit role and tenant authorization, and `POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/velo-sigma/exclusion` does not validate credentials. Its `return_username_for_logging` dependency in `backend/app/auth/utils.py` calls `decode_token`, which returns ordinary Invalid token or Expired signature strings on failure, and the dependency passes these strings through instead of rejecting the request. A Bearer header is required, but an arbitrary invalid, expired or forged value can create a suppression rule without a valid account. The collection GET at /create/velo-sigma/exclusion lists exclusions; the read, update and delete routes under `/create/velo-sigma/exclusion/{exclusion_id}`, and the `/velo-sigma/exclusion/{exclusion_id}/toggle` route, use `get_current_user` without role checks, permitting any authenticated `customer_user` to manage every exclusion. In `backend/app/incidents/services/velo_sigma.py`, `process_sigma_alert` calls `check_exclusions` and drops matching enabled alerts before incident creation. A null `customer_code` applies a rule across all tenants. Attackers can suppress detections platform-wide through channel, title or field matching, while low-privilege accounts can enumerate detection-tuning data and modify, disable or delete legitimate exclusions. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.77.
Patch / fix
- github.com/socfortress/CoPilot@d22f80f commit
- github.com/socfortress/CoPilot#942 pull request
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Check with FencerCISA SSVC
- Exploitation
- Proof of concept is public
- Automatable
- yes
- Technical impact
- partial
- Assessed
- 12d ago
Exploit prediction
0.37% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 31% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-11).
Exploits and checks
- github.com https://github.com/socfortress/CoPilot/security/advisories/GHSA-c6jc-rh4j-wg88 referenced PoC, tagged "exploit" by a source, unverified
CVSS scores
| assigned by | version | score | vector |
|---|---|---|---|
| CNA | 3.1 | 7.5 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N |
Affected products
- socfortress CoPilot
Classification
References
Sources
- CVE List CVE-2026-61739
- NVD CVE-2026-61739
- Maintainer advisory GHSA-c6jc-rh4j-wg88
Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.
The maintainers of socfortress/CoPilot published their own advisory on GitHub. Reviewed sources take precedence over it.