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Fencer Intel
high 7.4

CVE-2026-61791 json

OCO-Server: Stored XSS through agent hostnames in command buttons

published 3mo ago modified 13d ago also EUVD-2026-108209 , GHSA-9c2r-9j95-22pr

Unreviewed: the maintainers' own advisory

Published by the maintainers on their GitHub repository schorschii/OCO-Server. GitHub has not reviewed it into the GitHub Advisory Database, so the affected packages and versions are the maintainers' word. Read the full advisory on GitHub.

cvss
7.4
version 3.1, CNA
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
0.3%
EPSS 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 21%
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

OCO-Server is a self-hosted endpoint management application for computer inventory, software deployment, and mobile device management. Prior to 1.2.1, `Html::commandButton()` in `lib/Html.class.php` embeds an action URL containing a stored computer hostname into a JavaScript string in an inline `onclick` handler, using `htmlspecialchars(ENT_QUOTES)` only for HTML escaping. Browsers decode the HTML entities before interpreting the handler as JavaScript, allowing a crafted hostname to escape the string and execute script in an administrator's authenticated session when an affected command button is activated. `frontend/views/computer-details.php` passes `$computer->hostname` to this helper using `Computer::DEFAULT_COMPUTER_COMMANDS` in `lib/Models/Computer.class.php`, whose VNC, RDP, SSH, and Ping entries use `new_tab=false` and the vulnerable `window.location` branch. A remote attacker who possesses the shared `agent-registration-key` can use the `oco.agent.hello` handler in `frontend/api-agent.php` to store an unchecked hostname when `agent-self-registration-enabled` is enabled; self-registration is disabled by default. The vulnerable default command buttons require no custom command configuration. The injected script can abuse the administrator's privileges, including permission to deploy software jobs to managed computers. This issue is fixed in version 1.2.1.

Patch / fix

Is CVE-2026-61791 in your stack? Fencer shows which of your repositories are affected as soon as an advisory lands, and opens the fix as a pull request.

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CISA SSVC

Exploitation
none
Automatable
no
Technical impact
partial
Assessed
13d ago

Exploit prediction

0.29% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 21% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-11).

CVSS scores

assigned by version score vector
CNA 3.1 7.4 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N

Affected products

  • schorschii OCO-Server

Classification

Weakness
  • CWE-83 Improper Neutralization of Script in Attributes in a Web Page

References

Sources

Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.

The maintainers of schorschii/OCO-Server published their own advisory on GitHub. Reviewed sources take precedence over it.