CVE-2026-63377 json
TAKO AI Agent for Okta: Unauthenticated first-run administrator takeover
published 4mo ago modified 7d ago also EUVD-2026-114541 , GHSA-536w-42p8-3qv9
Unreviewed: the maintainers' own advisory
Published by the maintainers on their GitHub repository fctr-id/okta-ai-agent. GitHub has not reviewed it into the GitHub Advisory Database, so the affected packages and versions are the maintainers' word. Read the full advisory on GitHub.
- cvss
- 9.8
- version 3.1, CNA
- cisa kev
- Not listed
- not in CISA's catalog
- epss
- 0.4%
- EPSS 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 34%
- public exploits
- 0
- none known
Summary
TAKO AI Agent for Okta is a local-first AI agent that helps Okta administrators query tenant data using natural language. Prior to 3.0.1-beta, `POST /api/auth/setup` in `src/api/routers/auth.py` allows an unauthenticated network attacker to create the first administrator account before the legitimate owner completes initial setup. The `initial_setup` function checks only the `is_setup` completion flag and requires no authentication, one-time bootstrap token, or network restriction. The default `docker-compose.yml` publishes port 8001 on all interfaces, the `Dockerfile` starts the listener on 0.0.0.0, and `src/api/main.py` mounts the authentication router without a global authentication guard. The endpoint invokes `create_auth_user` with `UserRole.ADMIN` and `set_auth_cookie`, issuing a valid `fctr_session` JWT cookie. Localhost-only CORS rules do not restrict non-browser HTTP clients, and the setup operation does not require access to a real Okta tenant. The attacker becomes the sole administrator and prevents legitimate first-run setup, can read Okta-synced user data, API tokens, chat history, and application configuration, modify users and Okta integration credentials, and lock out administrators or disable the service. Already completed setup is rejected. This issue is fixed in version 3.0.1-beta.
Patch / fix
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Check with FencerCISA SSVC
- Exploitation
- Proof of concept is public
- Automatable
- yes
- Technical impact
- total
- Assessed
- 7d ago
Exploit prediction
0.40% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 34% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-11).
Exploits and checks
- github.com https://github.com/fctr-id/okta-ai-agent/security/advisories/GHSA-536w-42p8-3qv9 referenced PoC, tagged "exploit" by a source, unverified
CVSS scores
| assigned by | version | score | vector |
|---|---|---|---|
| CNA | 3.1 | 9.8 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
Affected products
- fctr-id okta-ai-agent
Classification
- Weakness
-
- CWE-306 Missing Authentication for Critical Functionality
References
Sources
- CVE List CVE-2026-63377
- NVD CVE-2026-63377
- Maintainer advisory GHSA-536w-42p8-3qv9
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The maintainers of fctr-id/okta-ai-agent published their own advisory on GitHub. Reviewed sources take precedence over it.