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Fencer Intel
medium 5.9

CVE-2026-63410 json

secp256k1-native: Compiler-reconstructed secret-dependent branch in native scalar multiplication

published 4mo ago modified 9d ago also EUVD-2026-114552 , GHSA-vp2j-gqfm-r3cf

Unreviewed: the maintainers' own advisory

Published by the maintainers on their GitHub repository sgbett/secp256k1-native. GitHub has not reviewed it into the GitHub Advisory Database, so the affected packages and versions are the maintainers' word. Read the full advisory on GitHub.

cvss
5.9
version 3.1, CNA
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
0.3%
EPSS 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 20%
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

secp256k1-native is a native C secp256k1 implementation for Ruby. In affected native builds, native constant-time scalar multiplication through `Point#mul` or `scalar_multiply_ct` can leak timing information about a secret scalar when compiled by a toolchain that reconstructs branchless selection into a branch. The `Montgomery ladder` uses `uint256_select` with an all-zeros or all-ones mask, but affected GCC builds at `-O2` recover the original condition and emit secret-dependent `je` or `jne` jumps whose timing correlates with scalar bits. This defeats the assumption behind the 0.17.0 `jp_add_internal` infinity-branch fix. A consumer must multiply a secret private key or nonce in a context where an attacker can observe timing; repeated measurements can statistically recover scalar bits. The defect is in the compiled binary, so source review or `ctgrind` on a non-reconstructing toolchain may miss it. GCC 14.3.0, 15.1.0, and 15.2.0 reproduced the branch reconstruction, and `extconf.rb` appends `-O2`. Tested GCC versions through 12.4.0 used bitwise operations and GCC 13.3.0 used constant-time `cmov`; the pure-Ruby path is not affected by this flaw and separately makes no constant-time claim. GCC 16 and clang were untested, and point releases, targets, and flag combinations were not exhaustively bisected. `Earlier pre-0.17.0 versions had different constant-time issues rather than this introduced select idiom.` Version 0.18.0 contains the verified fix. The advisory's broad pre-0.18.0 guidance also covers earlier, different constant-time issues; whether this CVE groups those issues or only the select idiom introduced in 0.17.0 remains unresolved.

Patch / fix

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CISA SSVC

Exploitation
Proof of concept is public
Automatable
no
Technical impact
partial
Assessed
9d ago

Exploit prediction

0.28% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 20% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-11).

Exploits and checks

  • github.com https://github.com/sgbett/secp256k1-native/security/advisories/GHSA-vp2j-gqfm-r3cf referenced PoC, tagged "exploit" by a source, unverified

CVSS scores

assigned by version score vector
CNA 3.1 5.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Affected products

  • sgbett secp256k1-native

Classification

Weakness
  • CWE-208 Observable Timing Discrepancy
  • CWE-1255 Comparison Logic is Vulnerable to Power Side-Channel Attacks

References

Sources

Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.

The maintainers of sgbett/secp256k1-native published their own advisory on GitHub. Reviewed sources take precedence over it.