CVE-2026-71238 json
DjangoCRM - Hardcoded Django SECRET_KEY Enables Session and CSRF Token Forgery
published 3mo ago modified 18d ago also EUVD-2026-53311
- cvss
- 9.1
- version 3.1, CNA
- cisa kev
- Not listed
- not in CISA's catalog
- epss
- 0.4%
- EPSS 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 38%
- public exploits
- 0
- none known
Summary
DjangoCRM ships with its Django SECRET_KEY hardcoded directly in the committed webcrm/settings.py rather than read from an environment variable. Since this key is used for session signing, CSRF token generation, and password reset tokens, anyone who reads the public repository can forge valid session cookies (including for the superadmin account), forge CSRF tokens, and forge password reset tokens, achieving full account takeover.
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Check with FencerCISA SSVC
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- yes
- Technical impact
- total
- Assessed
- 3mo ago
Exploit prediction
0.44% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 38% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-11).
CVSS scores
| assigned by | version | score | vector |
|---|---|---|---|
| CNA | 3.1 | 9.1 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N |
Affected products
- DjangoCRM django-crm
Classification
- Weakness
-
- CWE-798 Use of Hard-coded Credentials
References
-
github.com
/DjangoCRM/django-crm
third-party-advisory
Sources
- CVE List CVE-2026-71238
- NVD CVE-2026-71238
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