CVE-2026-78682 json
NLTK before 3.10.3 SSRF Protection Bypass via Proxy
published 3mo ago modified 30d ago also EUVD-2026-65228 , GHSA-6ww7-3frv-cqxh , PYSEC-2026-3733
- cvss
- 7.5
- version 3.1, CNA
- cisa kev
- Not listed
- not in CISA's catalog
- epss
- 0.4%
- EPSS 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 38%
- public exploits
- 0
- none known
Summary
NLTK before 3.10.3 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in nltk.pathsec.urlopen (and callers nltk.data.load, nltk.downloader.Downloader.index/download) when an HTTP proxy is configured. pathsec.urlopen validates the requested hostname locally, but proxy-handler inheritance disables the safe HTTP/HTTPS handlers so the actual fetch is performed by the proxy against a destination that is never re-validated. An attacker can supply a validated public URL that the proxy forwards to an internal loopback-only service, allowing disclosure of internal HTTP resources, loading of forged downloader indexes, and installation of attacker-chosen package content.
Patch / fix
Is CVE-2026-78682 in your dependencies? Fencer shows which of your repositories are affected as soon as an advisory lands, and opens the fix as a pull request.
Check with FencerVendor advisories
What the vendors themselves say about their products: affected, fixed or not affected, and what to do.
red hat product security vex CVE-2026-78682 updated cvss 7.5
nltk: NLTK: Server-Side Request Forgery via HTTP Proxy Configuration
-
Red Hat Exploit Intelligence exploit-intelligence-tech-preview/vulnerability-analysis-rhel9affected: workaround, no fix planned “Will not fix”
-
Red Hat Lightspeed Core lightspeed-core/rag-tool-cpu-rhel9, lightspeed-core/lightspeed-stack-rhel9, lightspeed-core/rag-tool-cuda-12.9-rhel9 Red Hat OpenShift Lightspeed openshift-lightspeed/lightspeed-ocp-rag-rhel9, openshift-lightspeed/lightspeed-service-api-rhel9, openshift-lightspeed-tech-preview/lightspeed-rag-tool-rhel9affected: workaround, no fix available
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Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2 ansible-automation-platform-25/lightspeed-chatbot-rhel8affected: workaround, no fix planned “Will not fix”
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Red Hat OpenShift AI 2.25 rhoai/odh-ta-lmes-job-rhel9 1791553527, rhoai/odh-llama-stack-core-rhel9 1791873747, rhoai/odh-pipeline-runtime-pytorch-llmcompressor-cuda-py312-rhel9 1791867208, rhoai/odh-workbench-jupyter-pytorch-llmcompressor-cuda-py312-rhel9 1791867189fixed: vendor fix RHSA-2026:87410
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Red Hat OpenShift AI 3.3 rhoai/odh-llama-stack-core-rhel9 1789121286fixed: vendor fix RHSA-2026:73987
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Red Hat OpenShift AI 3.4 rhoai/odh-ta-lmes-job-rhel9 1791470318, rhoai/odh-trustyai-garak-lls-provider-dsp-rhel9 1791785804, rhoai/odh-trustyai-nemo-guardrails-server-rhel9 1791556128fixed: vendor fix RHSA-2026:84734
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Red Hat OpenShift AI 3.5 rhoai/odh-ogx-core-rhel9 1790963109, rhoai/odh-ta-lmes-job-rhel9 1792501995, rhoai/odh-trustyai-garak-lls-provider-dsp-rhel9 1791953275, rhoai/odh-trustyai-nemo-guardrails-server-rhel9 1791566631fixed: vendor fix RHSA-2026:86891
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Red Hat OpenShift AI 2.25 rhoai/odh-rhel9-operator 1792570619, rhoai/odh-vllm-cpu-rhel9 1792018436, rhoai/odh-dashboard-rhel9 1791853525, rhoai/odh-modelmesh-rhel9 1790881700, rhoai/odh-operator-bundle 1792571069, rhoai/odh-vllm-cuda-rhel9 1791358976, +62 more Red Hat OpenShift AI 3.3 rhoai/odh-cli-rhel9 1790070206, rhoai/rhai-cli-rhel9 1790070206, rhoai/odh-mlflow-rhel9 1789653606, rhoai/odh-trainer-rhel9 1790136369, rhoai/odh-maas-api-rhel9 1790131842, rhoai/odh-mlserver-rhel9 1789121365, +76 more Red Hat OpenShift AI 3.4 rhoai/odh-cli-rhel9 1791509689, rhoai/rhai-cli-rhel9 1791509689, rhoai/odh-automl-rhel9 1791535789, rhoai/odh-mlflow-rhel9 1791865967, rhoai/odh-autorag-rhel9 1791557539, rhoai/odh-trainer-rhel9 1791869783, +97 more Red Hat OpenShift AI 3.5 rhoai/odh-cli-rhel9 1791945905, rhoai/rhai-cli-rhel9 1791945905, rhoai/odh-automl-rhel9 1791916705, rhoai/odh-mlflow-rhel9 1791947857, rhoai/odh-autorag-rhel9 1791903266, rhoai/odh-trainer-rhel9 1791952138, +109 morenot affected: vulnerable code not present
Red Hat CSAF VEX © Red Hat, Inc., from https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/; changed: reduced to product statuses and remediations. CC BY 4.0 · csaf
CISA SSVC
- Exploitation
- Proof of concept is public
- Automatable
- yes
- Technical impact
- partial
- Assessed
- 2mo ago
Exploit prediction
0.44% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 38% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-11).
Exploits and checks
- github.com https://github.com/nltk/nltk/security/advisories/GHSA-6ww7-3frv-cqxh referenced PoC, tagged "exploit" by a source, unverified
CVSS scores
| assigned by | version | score | vector |
|---|---|---|---|
| CNA | 4.0 | 8.7 | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N |
| CNA | 3.1 | 7.5 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N |
| CNA | 4.0 | 8.7 | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X |
Affected packages
| ecosystem | package | affected | fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| pypi | nltk | <3.10.3 |
3.10.3 |
Affected products
- nltk nltk
Classification
References
-
github.com
/nltk/nltk/commit/767333a005a1cd3d82d2029215f2dbe66a5844d9
web
-
github.com
/nltk/nltk/security/advisories/GHSA-6ww7-3frv-cqxh
vendor-advisory, exploit, web, evidence, advisory
-
vulncheck.com
/advisories/nltk-before-ssrf-protection-bypass-via-proxy
third-party-advisory, web, advisory
-
nvd.nist.gov
/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78682
advisory
-
github.com
/nltk/nltk
package
-
github.com
/nltk/nltk/releases/tag/v3.10.3
web
-
github.com
/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/nltk/PYSEC-2026-3733.yaml
web
Sources
- CVE List CVE-2026-78682
- GitHub Advisory GHSA-6ww7-3frv-cqxh
- NVD CVE-2026-78682
- OSV PYSEC-2026-3733
- Maintainer advisory GHSA-6ww7-3frv-cqxh
Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.
The maintainers of nltk/nltk published their own advisory on GitHub. Reviewed sources take precedence over it.