CVE-2026-85712 json
Chartbrew: Cross-tenant project takeover via body.team_id in /project routes
published 2mo ago modified 2d ago also EUVD-2026-118504 , GHSA-6gv3-8wxh-6vfq
Unreviewed: the maintainers' own advisory
Published by the maintainers on their GitHub repository chartbrew/chartbrew. GitHub has not reviewed it into the GitHub Advisory Database, so the affected packages and versions are the maintainers' word. Read the full advisory on GitHub.
- cvss
- 8.8
- version 3.1, CNA
- cisa kev
- Not listed
- not in CISA's catalog
- epss
- 0.4%
- EPSS 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 31%
- public exploits
- 0
- none known
Summary
Chartbrew is an open-source web application that can connect directly to databases and APIs and use the data to create charts. Prior to 5.2.3, the shared project permission check trusted a caller-controlled team_id and let the teamOwner/teamAdmin branch continue without confirming that the target project belonged to that team. The vulnerable surface is project routes and related authorization checks that accepted user-controlled project identifiers. An authenticated user who is an owner or admin of their own team submits a victim project id together with the attacker's own team_id in the request body; default self-signup grants the required role on the user's own team. Authorization is evaluated against the attacker-selected team instead of the target project's team, and the update path mass-assigns the request body without a project field allow-list. The attacker needs a valid Chartbrew account, an owner or admin role on their own team, and a victim project identifier; requests without the body team_id trick are rejected. The attacker can re-parent the victim project into their own team, gain full read and write access, expose it publicly, remove password protection, and cause the victim to lose it; the shared delete route also permits cross-tenant deletion. This issue is fixed in version 5.2.3.
Patch / fix
- depomo chartbrew 5.2.3
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- Exploitation
- Proof of concept is public
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- total
- Assessed
- 2d ago
Exploit prediction
0.37% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 31% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-11).
Exploits and checks
- github.com https://github.com/chartbrew/chartbrew/security/advisories/GHSA-6gv3-8wxh-6vfq referenced PoC, tagged "exploit" by a source, unverified
CVSS scores
| assigned by | version | score | vector |
|---|---|---|---|
| CNA | 3.1 | 8.8 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
Affected products
- chartbrew chartbrew
Classification
- Weakness
-
- CWE-639 Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
References
Sources
- CVE List CVE-2026-85712
- NVD CVE-2026-85712
- Maintainer advisory GHSA-6gv3-8wxh-6vfq
Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.
The maintainers of chartbrew/chartbrew published their own advisory on GitHub. Reviewed sources take precedence over it.
CPEs and fixed versions use Anchore's correction of NVD's data: Added CPE configurations because not yet analyzed by NVD.