CVE-2026-92613 json
Safe subscriber API materialises `&T` from shared-memory bytes without `ShmSend` bound or size/alignment check
published 2d ago modified 20h ago also EUVD-2026-129501 , GHSA-gq84-237w-c3cw
Unreviewed: the maintainers' own advisory
Published by the maintainers on their GitHub repository eclipse-iceoryx/iceoryx-rs. GitHub has not reviewed it into the GitHub Advisory Database, so the affected packages and versions are the maintainers' word. Read the full advisory on GitHub.
- cvss
- 1.0
- version 4.0, CNA
- cisa kev
- Not listed
- not in CISA's catalog
- epss
- 0.2%
- EPSS 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 10%
- public exploits
- 0
- none known
Summary
In Eclipse iceoryx-rs, versions 0.0.11 to 0.0.13 and 0.1.0 as well as on the latest main branch.
`SampleReceiver::<T>::take()` and `Sample::<T>::deref()` are safe functions that hand the caller a `&T` pointing at a chunk written by another iceoryx process, but the subscriber path neither requires `T: ShmSend` nor verifies that the received chunk is at least `size_of::<T>()` bytes / `align_of::<T>()`-aligned. A peer process that publishes an undersized chunk, or any chunk at all when the subscriber chose a pointer-bearing `T`, drives a `#![forbid(unsafe_code)]` subscriber into out-of-bounds reads of adjacent shared-memory chunks or dereference of a publisher-controlled pointer.
Resolution:
It will not be fixed since this is a known limitation in iceoryx as it is the users responsibility to specify the same data type on sender and receiver side.
[iceoryx2](https://github.com/eclipse-iceoryx/iceoryx2) is the successor of iceoryx-rs where the API is designed to prevent this by default.
It is strongly recommended to migrate to iceoryx2 which is actively maintained and receives security support.
The iceoryx-rs package has officially reached End-of-life and will not receive any features, bugfixes or security fixes.
Is CVE-2026-92613 in your stack? Fencer shows which of your repositories are affected as soon as an advisory lands, and opens the fix as a pull request.
Check with FencerCISA SSVC
- Exploitation
- Proof of concept is public
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- partial
- Assessed
- yesterday
Exploit prediction
0.20% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 10% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-20).
Exploits and checks
- github.com https://github.com/eclipse-iceoryx/iceoryx-rs/security/advisories/GHSA-gq84-237w-c3cw referenced PoC, tagged "exploit" by a source, unverified
CVSS scores
| assigned by | version | score | vector |
|---|---|---|---|
| CNA | 4.0 | 1.0 | CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:H/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N |
Affected products
- Eclipse Foundation Eclipse iceoryx™
Classification
References
Sources
- CVE List CVE-2026-92613
- NVD CVE-2026-92613
- Maintainer advisory GHSA-gq84-237w-c3cw
Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.
The maintainers of eclipse-iceoryx/iceoryx-rs published their own advisory on GitHub. Reviewed sources take precedence over it.