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Fencer Intel
low 3.3

CVE-2026-95822 json

Out-of-bounds read and kernel stack disclosure in the SOCKS5 client when the destination address family differs from the proxy address family

published 15h ago modified 14h ago also GHSA-xvvw-v57r-7rwm , EUVD-2026-127367

Unreviewed: the maintainers' own advisory

Published by the maintainers on their GitHub repository zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr. GitHub has not reviewed it into the GitHub Advisory Database, so the affected packages and versions are the maintainers' word. Read the full advisory on GitHub.

cvss
3.3
version 3.1, CNA
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
—
no EPSS score yet
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

The SOCKS5 client in subsys/net/lib/socks/socks.c built the CONNECT request in socks5_tcp_connect() by choosing the SOCKS5 address type from the address family of the proxy (proxy->sa_family) while reading the bytes out of the destination address supplied to connect(). A SOCKS5 request encodes the destination independently of the transport used to reach the proxy, so the two families are unrelated and nothing in the path forces them to agree: set_context_proxy() only requires the proxy family to match the socket, and zsock_connect_ctx() enters the SOCKS branch before any destination validation. With an IPv6 proxy and an AF_INET destination the code treated an 8-byte struct net_sockaddr_in as a struct net_sockaddr_in6 and copied the 16-byte sin6_addr from it, reading 12 bytes past the end of the object and transmitting them to the proxy.

With CONFIG_USERSPACE enabled, z_vrfy_zsock_connect() copies only addrlen user bytes into a stack-resident struct net_sockaddr_storage and enforces no per-family minimum length, so the oversized read stays within the storage but returns stale, uninitialised kernel-stack bytes. An unprivileged user-mode thread can therefore open an AF_INET6 stream socket, point setsockopt(SO_SOCKS5) at a proxy it controls, and call connect() with a short AF_INET destination to have the kernel send it 12 bytes of supervisor stack residue per attempt. Without CONFIG_USERSPACE the read runs past the end of the caller's own struct net_sockaddr_in, disclosing adjacent memory to the proxy; the family mismatch can arise unintentionally when a destination is obtained from DNS while an IPv6 proxy is configured.

Impact is limited to information disclosure of at most 12 bytes per connect() call, with no write primitive; the leak is delivered to whoever operates the SOCKS5 proxy. The mirrored pairing (IPv6 destination through an IPv4 proxy) is memory-safe but encoded the destination as SOCKS5_ATYP_IPV4 from the first four bytes of the IPv6 address, causing the proxy to connect to an unrelated host. Exploitation requires the non-default CONFIG_SOCKS option, a socket with SO_SOCKS5 configured, and both IPv4 and IPv6 support in the image.

The fix moves the encoding into a helper that selects the address type from dest->sa_family and validates dest_len against the matching struct net_sockaddr_in/struct net_sockaddr_in6 before copying, rejecting under-length or unsupported destinations with an error.

Patch / fix

  • zephyrproject zephyr 4.3.2, 4.5.0

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CISA SSVC

Exploitation
none
Automatable
no
Technical impact
partial
Assessed
15h ago

CVSS scores

assigned by version score vector
CNA 3.1 3.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Affected products

  • zephyrproject zephyr

Classification

Weakness

References

Sources

Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.

The maintainers of zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr published their own advisory on GitHub. Reviewed sources take precedence over it.