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Fencer Intel
medium 6.3

CVE-2026-96456 json

Reachy Mini Bluetooth PIN authentication can be bypassed by racing an authenticated device

published last mo. modified last mo. also EUVD-2026-85186 , GHSA-993g-hgjh-whmf

Unreviewed: the maintainers' own advisory

Published by the maintainers on their GitHub repository pollen-robotics/reachy_mini. GitHub has not reviewed it into the GitHub Advisory Database, so the affected packages and versions are the maintainers' word. Read the full advisory on GitHub.

cvss
6.3
version 3.1, CNA
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
0.2%
EPSS 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 16%
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

The Reachy Mini Bluetooth service asks a connecting device for a PIN before it will accept commands. The check protects the session but not the caller, so an attacker in Bluetooth range can ride along on someone else's successful authentication.

The authenticated state is kept in a single shared flag on the service instance rather than per device. BlueZ passes the calling device's identity to the characteristic write handler in the options argument, but WriteValue(self, value, options) in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/services/bluetooth/bluetooth_service.py ignores options entirely. The handler therefore has no idea which device sent a given write, and it cannot tell the authenticated one from any other.

Once any device completes the PIN exchange, the flag is set and every nearby device can send CMD_ commands until it resets. An attacker simply waits within radio range for a legitimate user to authenticate, then writes commands into the same window. No PIN is ever guessed or brute-forced.

This is the second step of a three-step chain that JFrog documented against the robot. The first is the unrestricted file upload in the media sounds API, tracked as CVE-2026-55419, which places an attacker-controlled script on the filesystem. This issue then provides command access over Bluetooth. The third is the Bluetooth command handler path traversal, tracked as CVE-2026-62661, which runs that script as root.

Is CVE-2026-96456 in your stack? Fencer shows which of your repositories are affected as soon as an advisory lands, and opens the fix as a pull request.

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CISA SSVC

Exploitation
none
Automatable
no
Technical impact
partial
Assessed
last mo.

Exploit prediction

0.25% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 16% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-11).

CVSS scores

assigned by version score vector
CNA 3.1 6.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L

Affected products

  • Pollen Robotics Reachy Mini

Classification

Weakness
  • CWE-362 Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization
  • CWE-287 Improper Authentication

References

Sources

Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.

The maintainers of pollen-robotics/reachy_mini published their own advisory on GitHub. Reviewed sources take precedence over it.