Skip to content
Fencer Intel
no cvss —

CVE-2026-98826 json

rtc: ac100: Fix clock provider use-after-free on probe failure

published 24d ago modified 24d ago also EUVD-2026-103766

cvss
—
not scored
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
0.2%
EPSS 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 9%
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

rtc: ac100: Fix clock provider use-after-free on probe failure

ac100_rtc_register_clks() registers the RTC-32k clock with clk_hw_register_fixed_rate() and the clock provider with of_clk_add_hw_provider(). Neither is device managed, and both are released only from ac100_rtc_remove(). The driver core does not call remove() when probe() fails: really_probe() reaches probe_failed below the device_remove() call and goes straight to releasing the device's managed resources.

ac100_rtc_probe() ends with

return devm_rtc_register_device(chip->rtc);

so if that fails after the clocks have been registered, the provider is left on the global of_clk_providers list holding chip->clk_data, which was allocated with devm_kzalloc() and is freed while probe() unwinds. A later lookup on this device tree node then reads freed memory in of_clk_hw_onecell_get(). Consumers that do exactly that exist in tree: the wifi power sequence nodes on sun8i-a83t-bananapi-m3 and sun8i-a83t-cubietruck-plus take <&ac100_rtc 1>, and the sun9i-a80 boards route osc32k through <&ac100_rtc 0>. The window is narrow, as devm_rtc_register_device() can only fail with -ENOMEM here, but the provider is left dangling whenever it does.

The RTC-32k clock is leaked on the same path. Since clk_core_lookup() searches a global list that is not scoped per device, __clk_register() rejects the duplicate name with -EEXIST, so the leak also makes a later probe of the same device fail.

The error path that returns -EINVAL when the ADDA 4M parent clock cannot be found leaks the RTC-32k clock in the same way. No provider has been registered at that point, so that one is a leak rather than a use-after-free.

Register both with devm_clk_hw_register_fixed_rate() and devm_of_clk_add_hw_provider() so that they are released whenever the device goes away, on a failed probe as well as on unbind. Devres releases in reverse order of acquisition, so the provider is removed before chip->clk_data is freed, and the clkout children are now unregistered before their parent rather than after it. ac100_rtc_unregister_clks() and the remove callback then have nothing left to do and are removed.

Patch / fix

  • Linux Linux 7.3
  • linux Debian 13 6.12.113-1
  • linux Debian 14 7.2.10-1
  • linux-6.12 Debian 12 6.12.113-1~deb12u1

debian advisories DEBIAN-CVE-2026-98826

  • linux Ubuntu 24.04 LTS 6.8.0-149.149
  • linux Ubuntu 26.04 LTS 7.0.0-43.43
  • linux-aws Ubuntu 24.04 LTS 6.8.0-1069.74
  • linux-aws Ubuntu 26.04 LTS 7.0.0-1017.18
  • linux-gcp Ubuntu 24.04 LTS 6.8.0-1073.81
  • linux-gcp Ubuntu 26.04 LTS 7.0.0-1017.19
  • linux-gke Ubuntu 24.04 LTS 6.8.0-1068.77
  • linux-gke Ubuntu 26.04 LTS 7.0.0-1010.11

ubuntu advisories UBUNTU-CVE-2026-98826

Ubuntu security data © Canonical Ltd., from https://github.com/canonical/ubuntu-security-notices via OSV; changed: normalised to fixed package versions per release. CC BY-SA 4.0

Is CVE-2026-98826 in your stack? Fencer shows which of your repositories are affected as soon as an advisory lands, and opens the fix as a pull request.

Check with Fencer

Vendor advisories

What the vendors themselves say about their products: affected, fixed or not affected, and what to do.

red hat product security vex CVE-2026-98826 updated cvss 4.7

kernel: kernel: Denial of service via use-after-free in the AC100 RTC driver

  • Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10 kernel
    affected: workaround, no fix available “Fix deferred”

Red Hat CSAF VEX © Red Hat, Inc., from https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/; changed: reduced to product statuses and remediations. CC BY 4.0 · csaf

Exploit prediction

0.20% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 9% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-11).

Affected products

  • Linux Linux

Classification

Technology feeds

References

Sources

Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.