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CVE-2026-99447 json

spi: spi-pci1xxxx: quiesce DMA engines on transfer timeout

published 14h ago modified 13h ago also EUVD-2026-130113

cvss
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not scored
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
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no EPSS score yet
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

spi: spi-pci1xxxx: quiesce DMA engines on transfer timeout

If a DMA-mapped transfer times out waiting for DMA_TERM and neither DMA abort interrupt arrived, pci1xxxx_spi_transfer_with_dma() returns through the error label while both DMA engines are still enabled, the done/abort interrupt status is still armed and the transfer state (p->xfer, p->tx_sgl, p->rx_sgl) is still registered.

The ISRs keep firing afterwards: they reprogram the DMA engines from p->tx_sgl / p->rx_sgl and signal completion through p->xfer and p->spi_xfer_done, all of which the SPI core is free to unmap or reuse once transfer_one() has returned, which is a use-after-free. A late done interrupt can also start the next transfer queued behind the failed one.

Stop both DMA engines, drain the pending done/abort interrupt status and synchronize the DMA IRQs before dropping the in-progress state and the transfer pointers, and re-enable the engines afterwards so that subsequent transfers keep working. The engines are only turned back on once both were confirmed to have stopped: re-enabling an engine that failed to stop would cancel the pending stop request and let it keep running into buffers the SPI core is about to unmap or free, which is exactly the window this patch closes. An engine that failed to stop is left disabled, as the abort paths already do.

The DMA interrupt status and mask registers are shared between the two SPI instances, so the cleanup drains only this instance's done/abort status bits instead of masking the interrupt lines, which would also suppress the peer instance's completion interrupts.

Also make the DMA ISRs ignore interrupts while no transfer is in progress so that a stray MSI after the cleanup can no longer act on the cleared state.

No PCI1XXXX hardware was available for testing and QEMU has no model of this PCIe part, so the timeout path was exercised with a userspace replica of the timeout branch and the DMA ISRs, with the register and interrupt accesses mocked: on the unfixed code both a wedged engine that clears after the timeout and a late done interrupt touch the freed transfer state, while with this fix applied neither does and an engine that failed to stop is left disabled. The module was also loaded and unloaded in a QEMU x86_64 guest running a kernel with this fix applied.

Patch / fix

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Vendor advisories

What the vendors themselves say about their products: affected, fixed or not affected, and what to do.

red hat product security vex CVE-2026-99447 updated cvss 4.1

kernel: kernel: Denial of Service via use-after-free in PCI1xxxx SPI driver upon transfer timeout

  • Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10 kernel Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 5 openshift/ose-rhel-coreos-10
    affected: no fix available “Fix deferred”
  • Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 perf, kernel, python-perf, kernel-kdump, kernel-firmware, kernel-bootwrapper, +1 more Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 perf, kernel, bpftool, kernel-rt, python-perf, kernel-kdump, +8 more Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 perf, kernel, bpftool, kernel-rt, kernel-core, kernel-tools, +29 more Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 rv, perf, rtla, kernel, bpftool, libperf, +83 more Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4 openshift/ose-rhel-coreos-8, openshift/ose-rhel-coreos-9 Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 5 openshift/ose-rhel-coreos-9
    not affected: vulnerable code not present

Red Hat CSAF VEX © Red Hat, Inc., from https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/; changed: reduced to product statuses and remediations. CC BY 4.0 · csaf

Affected products

  • Linux Linux

Classification

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References

Sources

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