GHSA-2mc2-g238-722j json
OpenClaw affected by iMessage remote attachment SCP hardening (strict host-key checks and remoteHost validation)
published 8mo ago modified 8mo ago
- cvss
- —
- not scored
- cisa kev
- Not listed
- not in CISA's catalog
- epss
- —
- no score, EPSS covers CVEs only
- public exploits
- 0
- none known
Summary
## Summary
Remote iMessage attachment fetches used SCP with trust-on-first-use host-key behavior and accepted unvalidated remote host tokens.
Before the fix: - SCP used `StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new` in the remote attachment path. - `channels.imessage.remoteHost` was not validated as a strict SSH host token.
## Impact
In remote iMessage deployments that use SCP attachment fetching, a first-connection MITM/DNS-poisoning scenario could cause the wrong host key to be trusted. Unsafe remote host token values could also alter SCP argument semantics.
## Affected Packages / Versions
- Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Latest published npm version currently affected: `2026.2.17` - Vulnerable range (structured field): `<= 2026.2.17` - Patched version (pre-set for next release): `>= 2026.2.19`
## Fix
The fix hardens remote attachment SSH/SCP handling by: - requiring `StrictHostKeyChecking=yes` for SCP and SSH tunnel paths, - adding strict `remoteHost` normalization/validation, - adding `--` argument barrier for SCP remote source parsing, - validating `channels.imessage.remoteHost` in config schema, - rejecting unsafe auto-detected host tokens at runtime.
## Fix Commit(s)
- Pushed to `main`: 49d0def6d1e88f002026b1d2a35aa615d48a751a
OpenClaw thanks @allsmog for reporting.
Patch / fix
Is GHSA-2mc2-g238-722j in your dependencies? Fencer shows which of your repositories are affected as soon as an advisory lands, and opens the fix as a pull request.
Check with FencerAffected packages
| ecosystem | package | affected | fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | openclaw | <2026.2.19 |
2026.2.19 |
Classification
References
Sources
- GitHub Advisory GHSA-2mc2-g238-722j
- Maintainer advisory GHSA-2mc2-g238-722j
Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.
The maintainers of openclaw/openclaw published their own advisory on GitHub. Reviewed sources take precedence over it.