GHSA-322x-v876-g883 json
@asymmetric-effort/nogginlessdom's Path Traversal in matchFileSnapshot allows arbitrary file write
published 4mo ago modified 2mo ago
- cvss
- —
- not scored
- cisa kev
- Not listed
- not in CISA's catalog
- epss
- —
- no score, EPSS covers CVEs only
- public exploits
- 0
- none known
Summary
## Summary
The `matchFileSnapshot` function in `src/assertions/snapshots.ts` accepted a `filePath` parameter with zero validation. When snapshot update mode was active (`UPDATE_SNAPSHOTS=1` or `setUpdateMode('all')`), an attacker who controls test input could write arbitrary content to any filesystem path the process has write access to, including creating intermediate directories.
## Affected Code
**File:** `src/assertions/snapshots.ts`, lines 732-769
```typescript export function matchFileSnapshot(actual: unknown, filePath: string): void { const serialized = serialize(actual); const mode = resolveUpdateMode(); const fileExists = fs.existsSync(filePath);
if (!fileExists) { if (mode === 'all' || mode === 'new') { const dir = path.dirname(filePath); if (!fs.existsSync(dir)) { fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true }); } fs.writeFileSync(filePath, serialized, 'utf-8'); ```
The `filePath` flows from `expect(value).toMatchFileSnapshot(filePath)` at `index.ts:1033-1035` with no sanitization, no check that the path is within an expected directory, and no symlink resolution.
## Proof of Concept
```typescript import { expect, setUpdateMode } from '@asymmetric-effort/nogginlessdom';
setUpdateMode('all');
// Writes arbitrary content to any writable path expect('malicious content').toMatchFileSnapshot('/tmp/exploit/payload.txt');
// Path traversal via relative components expect('data').toMatchFileSnapshot('../../../tmp/evil.txt');
// In CI environments, could overwrite CI config expect('injected step').toMatchFileSnapshot('/home/runner/.github/workflows/backdoor.yml'); ```
## Impact
In CI/CD environments where test files may come from untrusted pull requests, this allows writing to any writable filesystem location with directory creation. An attacker could overwrite configuration files, inject code into build artifacts, or modify CI pipeline definitions.
## Fix
Fixed in commit https://github.com/asymmetric-effort/NogginLessDom/commit/785e6ac6e124d1a89b3ccf40bbd75fc8e4cb215d on `main`. The `matchFileSnapshot` function now validates that the resolved file path is within the project root directory (defaults to `process.cwd()`, configurable via optional `projectRoot` parameter). Paths that resolve outside the project directory are rejected with a descriptive error.
```typescript export function matchFileSnapshot( actual: unknown, filePath: string, projectRoot?: string, ): void { const root = projectRoot ?? process.cwd(); const resolved = path.resolve(root, filePath); if (!resolved.startsWith(root + path.sep) && resolved !== root) { throw new Error( `File snapshot path must be within the project directory: ${filePath}`, ); } // ... all subsequent file I/O uses `resolved` instead of `filePath` } ```
Patch / fix
- npm @asymmetric-effort/nogginlessdom 0.0.22
Is GHSA-322x-v876-g883 in your dependencies? Fencer shows which of your repositories are affected as soon as an advisory lands, and opens the fix as a pull request.
Check with FencerAffected packages
| ecosystem | package | affected | fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | @asymmetric-effort/nogginlessdom | <0.0.22 |
0.0.22 |
Classification
- Weakness
-
- CWE-22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory
References
Sources
- GitHub Advisory GHSA-322x-v876-g883
Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.