GHSA-4xcc-23fx-w2wj json
Resource budgets not enforced on the typed deserialization path
published last mo. modified last mo. also RUSTSEC-2026-0333
- cvss
- —
- not scored
- cisa kev
- Not listed
- not in CISA's catalog
- epss
- —
- no score, EPSS covers CVEs only
- public exploits
- 0
- none known
Summary
`ParserConfig::max_events`, `max_nodes`, `max_total_scalar_bytes`, `max_merge_keys`, `alias_anchor_ratio` and the alias jump factor were enforced only by the two `Value` loaders. A typed target with a default-shaped configuration is served by the streaming deserializer, which never read those fields, so tightening any of them had no effect on `from_str::<T>` for a struct target. The default document-length, depth and alias-count caps were enforced on every path, so no input was unbounded; the gap affects callers who tightened the other budgets for hostile input.
Version 0.0.53 charges every budget on the streaming path as well and adds cross-path parity tests.
Users who cannot upgrade can deserialize into `noyalib::Value` first and convert with `from_value`, or rely on `max_document_length` and `max_depth`, which were always applied on every path.
Patch / fix
Is GHSA-4xcc-23fx-w2wj in your dependencies? Fencer shows which of your repositories are affected as soon as an advisory lands, and opens the fix as a pull request.
Check with FencerAffected packages
| ecosystem | package | affected | fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| crates.io | noyalib | >=0.0.0-0, <0.0.53 |
0.0.53 |
References
Sources
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