Signature Validation Bypass

published 2021-05-24 5y ago modified 2021-10-05 5y ago

cvss: —; not scored
cisa kev: Not listed; not in CISA's catalog
epss: —; no score, EPSS covers CVEs only
public exploits: 0; none known

### Impact Given a valid SAML Response, an attacker can potentially modify the document, bypassing signature validation in order to pass off the altered document as a signed one.

This enables a variety of attacks, including users accessing accounts other than the one to which they authenticated in the identity provider, or full authentication bypass if an external attacker can obtain an expired, signed SAML Response.

### Patches A patch is available, users of gosaml2 should upgrade to v0.5.0 or higher.

### References See the [underlying advisory on goxmldsig](https://github.com/russellhaering/goxmldsig/security/advisories/GHSA-q547-gmf8-8jr7) for more details.

Patch / fix

fixed in 1

go github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2 0.5.0

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Affected packages

ecosystem	package	affected	fixed in
go	github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2	<0.5.0	0.5.0

Classification

Weakness

CWE-347 Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature

References

Sources

GitHub Advisory GHSA-5684-g483-2249

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