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Fencer Intel
medium 5.3

GHSA-5h2c-8v84-qpvr json

OpenClaw shell-env fallback trusted startup env and could execute attacker-influenced login-shell paths

published 8mo ago modified 8mo ago

cvss
5.3
version 3.1, GitHub
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
—
no score, EPSS covers CVEs only
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

### Summary OpenClaw shell-env fallback trusted startup environment values and could execute attacker-influenced login-shell startup paths before loading env keys.

### Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Affected versions: `>= 2026.1.5` and `<= 2026.2.21-2` - Fixed on `main`: `9363c320d8ffe29290906752fab92621da02c3f7` - Planned patched release version (pre-set): `2026.2.22`

### Details The vulnerable chain was in the shell-env fallback path:

1. `src/infra/shell-env.ts` - `resolveShell(env)` trusted `env.SHELL` when set. - `execLoginShellEnvZero(...)` executed `${SHELL} -l -c "env -0"` with inherited runtime env.

2. `src/config/io.ts` - Config env values were applied before shell fallback execution.

3. `src/config/env-vars.ts` / env policy coverage - `SHELL` handling was hardened, but startup-path selectors (`HOME`, `ZDOTDIR`) still needed explicit blocking in config env ingestion and sanitization for shell fallback execution.

With env/config influence, this could trigger unintended command execution in shell startup processing on the OpenClaw host process context.

### Fix Mainline hardening now: - blocks `SHELL`, `HOME`, and `ZDOTDIR` during config env ingestion used by runtime fallback, - sanitizes shell fallback execution env, pinning `HOME` to the real user home and dropping `ZDOTDIR` + dangerous startup vars, - adds regression tests for config env ingestion and shell fallback/path-probe sanitization.

### Fix Commit(s) - `9363c320d8ffe29290906752fab92621da02c3f7`

### Impact - Local code-execution risk in environments where attacker-controlled env/config input can reach shell-env fallback. - Under OpenClaw trust assumptions (`SECURITY.md`), this is not a public-remote issue and depends on crossing local trusted-operator boundaries.

### Release Process Note `patched_versions` is intentionally pre-set to the planned next release (`2026.2.22`) so once npm release is out, maintainers can publish advisory immediately.

OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.

Patch / fix

  • npm openclaw 2026.2.22

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CVSS scores

assigned by version score vector
GitHub 3.1 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

Affected packages

ecosystem package affected fixed in
npm openclaw
<2026.2.22
2026.2.22

Classification

Weakness
  • CWE-15 External Control of System or Configuration Setting
  • CWE-78 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command

References

Sources

Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.

The maintainers of openclaw/openclaw published their own advisory on GitHub. Reviewed sources take precedence over it.