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GHSA-647h-p824-99w7 json

@grackle-ai/mcp has a workspace authorization bypass in its knowledge_search MCP tool

published 7mo ago modified 7mo ago

cvss
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not scored
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
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no score, EPSS covers CVEs only
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

### Impact

The `knowledge_search` and `knowledge_get_node` MCP tools are included in `SCOPED_TOOLS` (visible to scoped agents) but their handlers do not receive `authContext` and do not enforce workspace scoping. A scoped agent in Workspace A can supply an arbitrary `workspaceId` parameter to search or retrieve knowledge graph nodes from Workspace B, bypassing workspace isolation boundaries.

This is a **cross-workspace data leakage** vulnerability affecting any deployment where multiple workspaces contain sensitive knowledge graph data and scoped agents are used.

**Affected code:** - `packages/mcp/src/tools/knowledge.ts:146-169` (knowledge_search handler) - `packages/mcp/src/tools/knowledge.ts:244-283` (knowledge_get_node handler) - `packages/mcp/src/tool-scoping.ts:11` (both tools listed in SCOPED_TOOLS)

**Contrast with correct implementation:** `knowledge_create_node` (same file, lines 334-357) properly receives `authContext` and overrides the user-supplied `workspaceId` for scoped callers.

### Design Note

Cross-workspace knowledge sharing is a legitimate future feature — agents working across different repos may need to collaborate and share knowledge. However, this access should be **opt-in with explicit grants**, not an implicit bypass. The immediate fix locks scoped agents to their own workspace. A future design could introduce: - Workspace-level "share knowledge with" settings - A `cross_workspace` scope on scoped tokens - Explicit `workspaceIds` (plural) in the auth context

### Patches

**Fix:** Add `authContext` parameter to `knowledge_search` and `knowledge_get_node` handlers and enforce workspace scoping, matching the pattern in `knowledge_create_node`: ```typescript const resolvedWorkspaceId = authContext?.type === "scoped" ? authContext.workspaceId ?? "" : workspaceId ?? ""; ```

When cross-workspace collaboration is designed, this check can be relaxed intentionally with proper access controls.

### Workarounds

Do not use scoped agent tokens in multi-workspace deployments until patched. Alternatively, remove `knowledge_search` and `knowledge_get_node` from the `SCOPED_TOOLS` set in `tool-scoping.ts`.

### References

- CWE-284: Improper Access Control - File: `packages/mcp/src/tools/knowledge.ts` - File: `packages/mcp/src/tool-scoping.ts`

Patch / fix

  • npm @grackle-ai/mcp 0.70.2

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Affected packages

ecosystem package affected fixed in
npm @grackle-ai/mcp
<0.70.2
0.70.2

Classification

Weakness

References

Sources

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