GHSA-7632-4q2x-hvjw json
Stack overflow when parsing deeply nested input in pest_grammars
published 27d ago modified 27d ago also RUSTSEC-2026-0366
- cvss
- 3.3
- version 3.1, OSV
- cisa kev
- Not listed
- not in CISA's catalog
- epss
- —
- no score, EPSS covers CVEs only
- public exploits
- 0
- none known
Summary
## Impact
In affected versions, parsing deeply nested input with `pest_grammars::json::JsonParser` can exhaust the native stack and abort the hosting process. Applications that accept attacker-controlled JSON without suitable resource limits may therefore be vulnerable to denial of service.
The reported reproduction demonstrates this behavior with deeply nested JSON arrays. The nesting required to trigger an overflow depends on the platform, available stack space, and build configuration; there is no portable safe nesting threshold.
## Patches
Upgrade to `pest_grammars` 2.9.3 or later.
Version 2.9.3 requires the updated `pest` runtime and includes regression tests for deeply nested JSON with the optional call budget disabled. Supported std builds automatically check available native stack headroom at parser checkpoints and return a handled stack limit reached error when insufficient space is detected. This protection operates independently of `pest::set_call_limit()`. See the [2.9.3 dependencies](https://github.com/pest-parser/pest/blob/v2.9.3/grammars/Cargo.toml#L16-L18) and [deep-nesting regression tests](https://github.com/pest-parser/pest/blob/v2.9.3/grammars/src/lib.rs#L94-L215).
These checks are best-effort. They do not provide universal stack-overflow protection, apply when stack bounds cannot be determined, or provide native-stack protection in no_std builds.
## Workarounds and defense in depth
Applications unable to upgrade should reject excessive nesting before invoking the affected parser or configure a suitably conservative `pest::set_call_limit()` budget. A call budget is not a portable stack-depth guarantee.
Even after upgrading, applications parsing untrusted input should enforce workload-appropriate input, work, memory, and concurrency limits. Stack checks and call budgets do not enforce elapsed-time deadlines. Where a hard deadline or cancellation is required, use supervised parsing as described in the [security policy: Parsing Untrusted Input](https://github.com/pest-parser/pest/security/policy#parsing-untrusted-input).
Patch / fix
Is GHSA-7632-4q2x-hvjw in your dependencies? Fencer shows which of your repositories are affected as soon as an advisory lands, and opens the fix as a pull request.
Check with FencerCVSS scores
| assigned by | version | score | vector |
|---|---|---|---|
| OSV | 3.1 | 3.3 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L |
Affected packages
| ecosystem | package | affected | fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| crates.io | pest_grammars | >=0.0.0-0, <2.9.3 |
2.9.3 |
References
Sources
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