GHSA-7m8x-x364-m26j json
Signal K Server: Buffered logs exposed to unauthenticated WebSocket clients
published 2d ago modified 2d ago
- cvss
- 5.3
- version 3.1, GitHub
- cisa kev
- Not listed
- not in CISA's catalog
- epss
- —
- no score, EPSS covers CVEs only
- public exploits
- 0
- none known
Summary
### Summary
An unauthenticated WebSocket client can subscribe to the log path and receive buffered server logs.
WebSocket connections are intentionally permitted before authentication because login occurs over the WebSocket connection. However, the log subscription path does not enforce an authorization check.
`processSubscribe` handles subscriptions to the log path separately, without applying access control:
```ts if ( Array.isArray(msg.subscribe) && msg.subscribe.length > 0 && msg.subscribe[0].path === 'log' ) { if (!spark.logUnsubscribe) { spark.logUnsubscribe = startServerLog(app, spark) } } else { // normal subscriptions go through subscriptionmanager, which applies // securityStrategy.filterReadDelta } ```
`startServerLog` then replays the whole buffer to that socket:
```ts app.logging.getLog().forEach((log) => { spark.write({ type: 'LOG', data: log }) }) ```
The asymmetry is inside this one file. Writes are gated by `securityStrategy.shouldAllowWrite` (`ws.ts:961`), normal delta subscriptions are filtered by `securityStrategy.filterReadDelta` (`ws.ts:1159`, the else branch of this same function), and the log branch consults neither.
An unauthenticated socket, which is legitimately open for login, can subscribe to `log` and receive buffered server logs.
Fix: Requires an administrator principal, before `startServerLog`, in the same way the other branch defers to `securityStrategy`. The fix was released with version 2.31.0-beta.1.
The investigated code path was reviewed at commit 26ab199. No server was run and no WebSocket frames were captured. AI assistance was used during the investigation.
Patch / fix
- npm signalk-server 2.31.0-beta.1
Is GHSA-7m8x-x364-m26j in your dependencies? Fencer shows which of your repositories are affected as soon as an advisory lands, and opens the fix as a pull request.
Check with FencerCVSS scores
| assigned by | version | score | vector |
|---|---|---|---|
| GitHub | 3.1 | 5.3 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N |
Affected packages
| ecosystem | package | affected | fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | signalk-server | <2.31.0-beta.1 |
2.31.0-beta.1 |
Classification
- Weakness
-
- CWE-306 Missing Authentication for Critical Functionality
References
-
github.com
/SignalK/signalk-server/commit/1bee85114a4cb7403aba71632d9902792d6b4f0c
web
-
github.com
/SignalK/signalk-server/security/advisories/GHSA-7m8x-x364-m26j
web
-
github.com
/SignalK/signalk-server
package
-
github.com
/SignalK/signalk-server/releases/tag/v2.31.0
web
-
github.com
/SignalK/signalk-server/releases/tag/v2.31.0-beta.1
web
Sources
- GitHub Advisory GHSA-7m8x-x364-m26j
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