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Fencer Intel
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GHSA-8pqq-224h-x875 json

ogham-mcp had credentials embedded in published PyPI sdists -- Neon postgres URLs and Voyage API key

published 6mo ago modified 6mo ago

cvss
—
not scored
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
—
no score, EPSS covers CVEs only
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

## Summary

Between 2026-02 and 2026-04-24 a total of 22 public PyPI sdists of `ogham-mcp` contained development credentials embedded in source files. All credentials have since been rotated on the respective providers. No known exploitation. Upgrade to **v0.11.1** to get a clean release.

## What was leaked

| Credential | Location in sdist | Vulnerable range | Count | |---|---|---|---| | 3x Neon postgres URLs with passwords (US / EU / AP development databases) | top-level `Makefile` (`NEON_US`, `NEON_EU`, `NEON_AP` vars) | `>=0.6.5, <0.11.0` | 21 sdists | | 1x Voyage AI API key (`pa-...`) | `tests/test_hooks.py::test_mask_secrets_key_value` -- test fixture that fed a real key into the redaction-function tester | `>=0.6.3, <0.11.1` | 22 sdists |

## Impact

- **Primary risk**: any consumer of the affected sdists could have extracted the credentials and used them. The Neon URLs pointed at development databases; the Voyage key was a rate-limited API key. - **Observed exploitation**: none detected. Audit logs on both providers were reviewed post-rotation. - **Remediation on our side**: - Neon passwords for all three regions rotated. - Voyage API key rotated. - All affected versions yanked from PyPI (v0.3.0 through v0.10.4 yanked on 2026-04-24; v0.11.0 pending yank after this advisory). - v0.11.0 removed the Neon URLs and introduced `make publish-check` which scans every sdist for credential patterns before upload. - v0.11.1 scrubs the Voyage key from the test fixture and excludes `benchmarks/`, `docs/`, `research/`, `extras/`, and `**/*.env*` from all future sdists via explicit hatchling sdist include/exclude in `pyproject.toml`.

## Action for users

- If users installed any version from `v0.3.0` through `v0.11.0`, upgrade to **v0.11.1** immediately: ``` pip install --upgrade "ogham-mcp>=0.11.1" ``` - Users do not need to rotate anything on their end. The leaked credentials were owned by the project maintainer, not by users.

## Credit

Discovered during an internal pre-release audit on 2026-04-24 while preparing v0.11.1.

Patch / fix

  • pypi ogham-mcp 0.11.1

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Affected packages

ecosystem package affected fixed in
pypi ogham-mcp
>=0.6.3, <0.11.1
0.11.1

Classification

Weakness
  • CWE-798 Use of Hard-coded Credentials

References

Sources

Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.