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Fencer Intel
high —

GHSA-9237-rg5p-rhfw json

@saltcorn/data: Tenant user role is used for tenant creation role check

published 6mo ago modified 6mo ago

cvss
—
not scored
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
—
no score, EPSS covers CVEs only
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

## Summary

When a tenant admin is logged out of the root domain (e.g., saltcorn.com) but logged in to their own tenant space as admin, they can simply append `/tenant/create` to their tenant URL. The system reads the role from the tenant context (admin), and a new tenant is created on the **root domain** (in `PUBLIC SCHEMA > _sc_tenants`), rather than in the tenant's own `_sc_tenants` table.

If the same logic applies to other routes, a tenant admin effectively gains admin rights on the root domain.

## PoC

A tenant-created subtenant appears under the Saltcorn public schema instead of the tenant's own schema.

- Even when `role_id=1` is required for tenant creation on saltcorn.com (only admin can create tenants), existing tenant admins can still create new tenants because their local `role_id:1` is evaluated against the root domain. - Even when `role_to_create_tenant` is set to `0` in the tenant's `_sc_config` schema, or removed entirely, the tenant admin can still create sub-tenants on the root domain — suggesting `role_to_create_tenant` is not being read at all.

## Impact

Tenant admins gain unauthorized admin-level access to the root domain. Any authenticated tenant admin can perform privileged operations (e.g., creating tenants) on the root domain by exploiting the role context mismatch.

Patch / fix

  • npm @saltcorn/data 1.4.4, 1.5.2, 1.6.0-beta.2

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Affected packages

ecosystem package affected fixed in
npm @saltcorn/data
<1.4.4
>=1.5.0-beta.0, <1.5.2
>=1.6.0-alpha.0, <1.6.0-beta.2
1.4.4
1.5.2
1.6.0-beta.2

Classification

Weakness

References

Sources

Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.