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Fencer Intel
high 7.2

GHSA-fm76-w8jw-xf8m json

@saltcorn/plugins-loader unsanitized plugin name leads to a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability when creating plugins using git source

published 2y ago modified 2y ago

cvss
7.2
version 3.1, GitHub
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
—
no score, EPSS covers CVEs only
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

### Summary

When creating a new plugin using the `git` source, the user-controlled value `req.body.name` is used to build the plugin directory where the location will be cloned. The API used to execute the `git clone` command with the user-controlled data is `child_process.execSync`. Since the user-controlled data is not validated, a user with admin permission can add escaping characters and execute arbitrary commands, leading to a command injection vulnerability.

### Details

Relevant code from source (`req.body`) to sink (`child_process.execSync`).

- file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/server/routes/plugins.js#L1400

```js router.post( "/", isAdmin, error_catcher(async (req, res) => { const plugin = new Plugin(req.body); // [1] [...] try { await load_plugins.loadAndSaveNewPlugin( // [3] plugin, schema === db.connectObj.default_schema || plugin.source === "github" ); [...] } }) ); ```

- file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/saltcorn-data/models/plugin.ts#L44 ```js class Plugin { [...] constructor(o: PluginCfg | PluginPack | Plugin) { [...] this.name = o.name; // [2] [...] } ```

- file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/server/load_plugins.js#L64-L65 ```js const loadAndSaveNewPlugin = async (plugin, force, noSignalOrDB) => { [...] const loader = new PluginInstaller(plugin); // [4] const res = await loader.install(force); // [7] [...] }; ```

- file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/plugins-loader/plugin_installer.js#L41-L61 ```js class PluginInstaller { constructor(plugin, opts = {}) { [...] const tokens = plugin.source === "npm" ? plugin.location.split("/") : plugin.name.split("/"); // [5] [...] this.tempDir = join(this.tempRootFolder, "temp_install", ...tokens); // [6] [...] }

async install(force) { [...] if (await this.prepPluginsFolder(force, pckJSON)) { // [8] [...] }

async prepPluginsFolder(force, pckJSON) { [...] switch (this.plugin.source) { [...] case "git": if (force || !(await pathExists(this.pluginDir))) { await gitPullOrClone(this.plugin, this.tempDir); // [9] [...] } ```

- file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/plugins-loader/download_utils.js#L112 ```js const gitPullOrClone = async (plugin, pluginDir) => { [...] if (fs.existsSync(pluginDir)) { execSync(`git ${setKey} -C ${pluginDir} pull`); } else { execSync(`git ${setKey} clone ${plugin.location} ${pluginDir}`); // [10] } [...] }; ```

### PoC

- check that the file will be created by the command `echo "hello">/tmp/HACKED` does not exists: ``` cat /tmp/HACKED cat: /tmp/HACKED: No such file or directory ``` - login with an admin account - visit `http://localhost:3000/plugins/new` - enter the following fields: - Name: `;echo "hello">/tmp/HACKED` - Source: `git` - other fields blank - click `Create` - you will get an error saying `ENOENT: no such file or directory, ....` but the command `touch /tmp/HACKED` will be executed - to verify: ``` cat /tmp/HACKED hello ```

### Impact

Remote code execution

### Recommended Mitigation

Sanitize the `pluginDir` value before passing to `execSync`. Alternatively, use `child_process. execFileSync` API (docs: https://nodejs.org/api/child_process.html#child_processexecfilesyncfile-args-options)

Patch / fix

  • npm @saltcorn/plugins-loader 1.0.0-beta.14

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CVSS scores

assigned by version score vector
GitHub 3.1 7.2 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Affected packages

ecosystem package affected fixed in
npm @saltcorn/plugins-loader
<1.0.0-beta.14
1.0.0-beta.14

Classification

Weakness
  • CWE-78 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command

References

Sources

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