GHSA-g4v6-69p6-q3p4 json
WiX Burn-based bundles are vulnerable to binary hijack when run as SYSTEM
published 2y ago modified 2y ago
- cvss
- 7.3
- version 3.1, GitHub
- cisa kev
- Not listed
- not in CISA's catalog
- epss
- —
- no score, EPSS covers CVEs only
- public exploits
- 0
- none known
Summary
# Summary
Burn uses an unprotected C:\Windows\Temp directory to copy binaries and run them from there. This directory is not entirely protected against low privilege users.
# Details
When a bundle runs as SYSTEM user, Burn uses GetTempPathW which points to an insecure directory C:\Windows\Temp to drop and load multiple binaries. Standard users can hijack the binary before it's loaded in the application resulting in elevation of privileges.
``` icacls c:\windows\temp
BUILTIN\Users:(CI)(S,WD,AD,X) BUILTIN\Administrators:(F) BUILTIN\Administrators:(OI)(CI)(IO)(F) NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(F) NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(OI)(CI)(IO)(F) CREATOR OWNER:(OI)(CI)(IO)(F) ```
Built in users(non-administrators) have special permissions to this folder and can create files and write to this directory. While they do not have explicit read permissions, there is a way they can monitor the changes to this directory using ReadDirectoryChangesW API and thus figure out randomized folder names created inside this directory as wel
# PoC
PoC works against the against visual studio enterprise with update 3 installer
## Reproduction steps
As a standard user, run the poc. Mount the iso and run visual studio [installer ](https://myvs.download.prss.microsoft.com/dbazure/en_visual_studio_enterprise_2015_with_update_3_x86_x64_dvd_8923288.iso?t=8132cd54-4b83-4478-8b73-fd9eb93437bf&P1=1709239640&P2=601&P3=2&P4=iorgKPv%2bG8n2NANTPUVoB92rr8t3W4XM594%2f9BtQQJrYrr8SwxGDxV%2fj%2f2F6Ulto0bXrIaFoZUr4yV37YAsOZVpM29IMtQEO0673AbDVuTe93qDb6wb7xdlpZSse0LZURUwwIFw5cwHQS2ZtvkunXE0osgXtEBT2IzVbPwVH39%2fum854xb4e2Dp61wgNrMZcOLLluBbeA3KX1sP3mm7WAWXBvlFiQWEnTfR5XH5mlLyPy2qfqCXWCjl84jNX7uY%2bpLR1IbfeD2JlcIQNeW2QrvmmqRrRbGvvaCA97IaSjM16XcDqVjvAEGW3sWXUc7y%2fEf68WZIyT7iilaEDUvaqqA%3d%3d&su=1)as local system account. The PoC should hijack the the binaries dropped by vs installer and a child process "notepad.exe" will be running.
# Impact
This is an Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability where a low privileged user can hijack binaries in an unprotected path C:\Windows\Temp to elevate to the SYSTEM user privileges.
Patch / fix
Is GHSA-g4v6-69p6-q3p4 in your dependencies? Fencer shows which of your repositories are affected as soon as an advisory lands, and opens the fix as a pull request.
Check with FencerCVSS scores
| assigned by | version | score | vector |
|---|---|---|---|
| GitHub | 3.1 | 7.3 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
Affected packages
| ecosystem | package | affected | fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| nuget | PanelSwWix4.Sdk | <5.0.0-psw-wix.0265-49 |
5.0.0-psw-wix.0265-49 |
References
Sources
- GitHub Advisory GHSA-g4v6-69p6-q3p4
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