- cvss
- —
- not scored
- cisa kev
- Not listed
- not in CISA's catalog
- epss
- —
- no score, EPSS covers CVEs only
- public exploits
- 0
- none known
Summary
@alovak found that currently when we build hash of account number we do not "salt" it. Which makes it vulnerable to rainbow table attack.
**What did you expect to see?** I expected salt (some random number from configuration) to be used in [hash.AccountNumber](https://github.com/moov-io/customers/blob/master/pkg/secrets/hash/account_number.go#L13)
I would generate salt per tenant at least (maybe per organization).
Patch / fix
- go github.com/moov-io/customers 0.5.0
Is GHSA-g636-q5fc-4pr7 in your dependencies? Fencer shows which of your repositories are affected as soon as an advisory lands, and opens the fix as a pull request.
Check with FencerAffected packages
| ecosystem | package | affected | fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| go | github.com/moov-io/customers | <0.5.0 |
0.5.0 |
References
Sources
- GitHub Advisory GHSA-g636-q5fc-4pr7
Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.