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low 2.5

GHSA-g7r4-m6w7-qqqr json

esbuild allows arbitrary file read when running the development server on Windows

published 5mo ago modified 2mo ago

cvss
2.5
version 3.1, GitHub
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
—
no score, EPSS covers CVEs only
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

### Summary

The development server contains a path traversal vulnerability on Windows when serving files from `servedir`.

Due to the use of `path.Clean()` (which only normalizes forward-slash `/` separators) instead of a Windows-aware path normalization function, it is possible to craft requests using backslashes (`\`) that bypass the intended directory containment logic. An attacker can escape the configured `servedir` root and access arbitrary files on the filesystem. This issue affects Windows environments only.

### Details

The request path is sanitized using: ```go // https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/v0.27.3/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L165 queryPath := path.Clean(req.URL.Path)[1:] ```

However: - `path.Clean()` is POSIX-style and only understands `/` (docs: `https://pkg.go.dev/path#Clean`) - On Windows, `\` is a valid path separator - `path.Clean()` does not treat `\` as a separator

Later, the server constructs the absolute path: ```go // https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/v0.27.3/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L221 absPath := h.fs.Join(h.servedir, queryPath) ```

If `queryPath` contains sequences such as: ``` ..\..\..\..\..\..\..\Windows\system.ini ```

`path.Clean()` will not normalize them, but the Windows filesystem will interpret `\` as directory separators when resolving `absPath`. Because the implementation does not verify that the final resolved path remains within `servedir`, it allows directory traversal outside the intended root directory. ### Vulnerable Code

```go // https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/v0.27.3/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L165 queryPath := path.Clean(req.URL.Path)[1:] .... // Check for a file in the "servedir" directory if h.servedir != "" && kind != fs.FileEntry { absPath := h.fs.Join(h.servedir, queryPath) if absDir := h.fs.Dir(absPath); absDir != absPath { if entries, err, _ := h.fs.ReadDirectory(absDir); err == nil { if entry, _ := entries.Get(h.fs.Base(absPath)); entry != nil && entry.Kind(h.fs) == fs.FileEntry { .... ```

### Steps to reproduce

``` npm install --save-exact --save-dev esbuild

echo "console.log(1)" > app.js

.\node_modules\.bin\esbuild --version 0.27.3

.\node_modules\.bin\esbuild app.js --bundle --outdir=www --servedir=www --watch

curl -i --path-as-is "http://localhost:8000/..\..\..\..\..\..\..\Windows\system.ini" <content of Windows\system.ini> ```

### Impact

- Arbitrary file read on Windows - Exposure of sensitive files

Patch / fix

  • npm esbuild 0.28.1

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CVSS scores

assigned by version score vector
GitHub 3.1 2.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

Affected packages

ecosystem package affected fixed in
npm esbuild
>=0.27.3, <0.28.1
0.28.1

Classification

Weakness
  • CWE-22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory

References

Sources

Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.

The maintainers of evanw/esbuild published their own advisory on GitHub. Reviewed sources take precedence over it.