GHSA-g7r4-m6w7-qqqr json
esbuild allows arbitrary file read when running the development server on Windows
published 5mo ago modified 2mo ago
- cvss
- 2.5
- version 3.1, GitHub
- cisa kev
- Not listed
- not in CISA's catalog
- epss
- —
- no score, EPSS covers CVEs only
- public exploits
- 0
- none known
Summary
### Summary
The development server contains a path traversal vulnerability on Windows when serving files from `servedir`.
Due to the use of `path.Clean()` (which only normalizes forward-slash `/` separators) instead of a Windows-aware path normalization function, it is possible to craft requests using backslashes (`\`) that bypass the intended directory containment logic. An attacker can escape the configured `servedir` root and access arbitrary files on the filesystem. This issue affects Windows environments only.
### Details
The request path is sanitized using: ```go // https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/v0.27.3/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L165 queryPath := path.Clean(req.URL.Path)[1:] ```
However: - `path.Clean()` is POSIX-style and only understands `/` (docs: `https://pkg.go.dev/path#Clean`) - On Windows, `\` is a valid path separator - `path.Clean()` does not treat `\` as a separator
Later, the server constructs the absolute path: ```go // https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/v0.27.3/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L221 absPath := h.fs.Join(h.servedir, queryPath) ```
If `queryPath` contains sequences such as: ``` ..\..\..\..\..\..\..\Windows\system.ini ```
`path.Clean()` will not normalize them, but the Windows filesystem will interpret `\` as directory separators when resolving `absPath`. Because the implementation does not verify that the final resolved path remains within `servedir`, it allows directory traversal outside the intended root directory. ### Vulnerable Code
```go // https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/v0.27.3/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L165 queryPath := path.Clean(req.URL.Path)[1:] .... // Check for a file in the "servedir" directory if h.servedir != "" && kind != fs.FileEntry { absPath := h.fs.Join(h.servedir, queryPath) if absDir := h.fs.Dir(absPath); absDir != absPath { if entries, err, _ := h.fs.ReadDirectory(absDir); err == nil { if entry, _ := entries.Get(h.fs.Base(absPath)); entry != nil && entry.Kind(h.fs) == fs.FileEntry { .... ```
### Steps to reproduce
``` npm install --save-exact --save-dev esbuild
echo "console.log(1)" > app.js
.\node_modules\.bin\esbuild --version 0.27.3
.\node_modules\.bin\esbuild app.js --bundle --outdir=www --servedir=www --watch
curl -i --path-as-is "http://localhost:8000/..\..\..\..\..\..\..\Windows\system.ini" <content of Windows\system.ini> ```
### Impact
- Arbitrary file read on Windows - Exposure of sensitive files
Patch / fix
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Check with FencerCVSS scores
| assigned by | version | score | vector |
|---|---|---|---|
| GitHub | 3.1 | 2.5 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N |
Affected packages
| ecosystem | package | affected | fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | esbuild | >=0.27.3, <0.28.1 |
0.28.1 |
Classification
- Weakness
-
- CWE-22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory
References
Sources
- GitHub Advisory GHSA-g7r4-m6w7-qqqr
- Maintainer advisory GHSA-g7r4-m6w7-qqqr
Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.
The maintainers of evanw/esbuild published their own advisory on GitHub. Reviewed sources take precedence over it.