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Fencer Intel
medium —

GHSA-m99c-q26r-m7m7 json

Evmos vulnerable to unauthorized account creation with vesting module

published 2y ago modified 8mo ago also GO-2024-2731

cvss
—
not scored
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
—
no score, EPSS covers CVEs only
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_

Using the vesting module, a malicious attacker can create a new vesting account at a given address, before a contract is created on that address.

Addresses of smart contracts deployed to the EVM are deterministic. Therefore, it would be possible for an attacker to front-run a contract creation and create a vesting account at that address. When an address has been initialized without any contract code deployed to it, it will not be possible to upload any afterwards. In the described attack, this would mean that a malicious actor could prevent smart contracts from being deployed correctly.

In order to remediate this, an alternative user flow is being implemented for the vesting module: - only the account receiving the vesting funds will be able to create such an account by calling the `CreateClawbackVestingAccount` method and defining a funder address - vesting and lockup periods can then be created by that funder address using `FundClawbackAccount`

### Patches _Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_

### Workarounds _Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_

### References _Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_

Is GHSA-m99c-q26r-m7m7 in your dependencies? Fencer shows which of your repositories are affected as soon as an advisory lands, and opens the fix as a pull request.

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Affected packages

ecosystem package affected fixed in
go github.com/evmos/evmos/v13/x/vesting
<=13.0.2
no fix listed
go github.com/evmos/evmos/v13
<=13.0.2
all versions
no fix listed
go github.com/evmos/evmos
all versions
no fix listed
go github.com/evmos/evmos/v2
all versions
no fix listed
go github.com/evmos/evmos/v3
all versions
no fix listed
go github.com/evmos/evmos/v4
all versions
no fix listed
go github.com/evmos/evmos/v5
all versions
no fix listed
go github.com/evmos/evmos/v6
all versions
no fix listed
go github.com/evmos/evmos/v7
all versions
no fix listed
go github.com/evmos/evmos/v8
all versions
no fix listed
go github.com/evmos/evmos/v9
all versions
no fix listed
go github.com/evmos/evmos/v10
all versions
no fix listed
go github.com/evmos/evmos/v11
all versions
no fix listed
go github.com/evmos/evmos/v12
all versions
no fix listed

References

Sources

Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.